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

LET THE U. N. HANDLE IT

Henry S. Reuss

WHY THE U. N. SURVIVES

Stephanie Harrington

THE SPECTER OF MODERNISM

John Ratte

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CORRESPONDENCE

"Revolt of the Left-Outs"

Pittsburgh, Pa.

To the Editors: In "COMMONWEAL: P. 442, 25 June, 1965," one Sidney Lens writes ". . ., McDonald, who had worked in the mills only one summer while at school, . . ."

Have we so soon forgotten the Eighth Commandment? If one lie is written in any article, then the entire article can be considered nothing but very poor fiction.

If Lens had bothered to do any research beyond the propaganda of my opponents he would have found out some truths. I worked for Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, National Tube Company and Wheeling Steel Products Company, all in Pittsburgh from the Fall of 1917 until September, 1923. The employment records still exist. So his lie on this one matter casts a serious doubt on his entire treatise. Perhaps my serious mistake down through the years was my firm belief in the encylicals on labor of Popes Leo and Pius, and my attempt to pattern my leadership after them. But, somehow or other I cannot bring myself to believe that I was wrong.

DAVID J. MC DONALD

Reply

Chicago, Ill.

To the Editors: The main theme of my article was that McDonald lost because there was a pervasive feeling of alienation in the ranks – because members felt they were left out of the process of decision-making.

I can't see how a peripheral remark about McDonald's work record affects this basic argument. Whether McDonald worked one summer or six years in the mills, as he claims, does not alter the fact that large numbers of steelworkers voted against him because they felt he was too remote from their interests.

As to the specific point, McDonald's work record, he certainly knows that it has been a point of dispute for years. The only documentation I know of that claims he worked six years in the mills is the one in a book paid for by the Union, while McDonald was its president, and an unquestioned "puff" job. The other sources I've seen say he worked only one summer in the mills. Either way it has nothing to do with my central argument. SIDNEY LENS

Marxists and Christ

New York City

To the Editors: Having read Gunnar D. Kumlien's "A Marxist's Christ" [July 2] I was a little startled by the seemingly naive bewilderment about a leftist intellectual making a film from the Bible, and using a cosmopolitan crew of leftist Romans as the actors. If one were to read Marx's Engels' articles on religion or to look at the history of the intellectual life of the left before Hitler rose to power (and Stalin) one would find that the left has not been anti-religious as such (except for the syndicalists), and has sometimes had some sensible things to say on the subject. Was not Karl Kautsky one of the great scholars on the subject of religion in his day?

But if anyone is in doubt as to the fitting nature of the Bible as a ready text for left-wing sermons, let him only read thoroughly the Revelations of St. John, the last book of the Bible, a vociferous and extremist anti-imperialist tract if there ever was one. In fact, even if one is just plain confused by today's events and the way in which most people of position must equivocate as to what is happening in the world, let him but read St. John's Revelations with an open mind and he will find much clarity, whatever his particular sectarian faith. JAMES S. BROOK

Mountain or Molehill?

Quincy, Ill.

To the Editors: I have read with great interest Daniel Callahan's "The New Freedom" [June 18]. It was very interesting and lively reading. From reading his article one would think that the entire Catholic world was in a state of dramatic upheaval. And wherever we turn we find people anxious to exercise their "new-found freedom."

For the past four years I have been an assistant in a large midwestern parish. But I fail to see people who act like prisoners recently freed from their chains. Sometimes I feel that the Catholic *intelligentsia* is trying very hard to make the proverbial mountain out of a molehill.

Personally, I feel that the vast masses of Catholic and Christian people are more existential in their thinking than are the scholars, lay or clerical. The people want "the thing" and are not very concerned at all about how it works. For the many, Vatican II and all that is written about it—and the conservatives vs. the liberals—is simply another column in their after-supper reading. In fact, this is what worries me more than the "great, new revolution." Sometimes I wonder why one end of the Church can talk up a storm about the great necessity for reform; while the end I deal with couldn't care less.

Did you ever try to tell a young high-schooler that "we must make the symbolism of the Mass more meaningful," when he hardly knows that there's any symbolism in the Mass to start with? How do you convey to an old lady that the Mass is "the Paschal Mystery," when she doesn't know what "Paschal" means or what "mystery" means—nor does she really care. When an anxious husband rings the phone at midnight for the priest to come and anoint his wife who "took a turn for the worst," he couldn't care less whether it's given in Latin, English, or Bantu.

I am not holding up for traditionalism at all. But I am saying that all the hubbub about ecclesial revolution sort of pales in the light of actual human needs. When hundreds of parents are present on Confirmation night, stretching their necks to see Johnny or Mary up there in front, they're not too concerned whether the Bishop wears a miter or a top hat. He just better be there to do the confirming.

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When you start talking "revolution," you get as complicated as the thing you're revolting against. And I think history sort of shows this too. For the sake of revolution do we not simply exchange one complicated mess for another? So now the Bishops are often power-hungry. Well who says the reformer can't get just as power-hungry? So the ranks of the powers-that-be get narrow-minded. What's to prevent the powers-that-would-be from getting just as narrow-minded?

What we could all use more of is some simple, practical, every-day charity. We also need a lot more downright self-denial and poverty. This has an existential meaning that speaks in human terms to human beings struggling to remain sons and daughters of Our Father in heaven.

(REV.) ANSGAR HANKEY, O.F.M.

"Housing the Poor"

Cambridge, Mass.

To the Editors: In his article, "Housing the Poor" [June 11] Woody Klein has made a good criticism of the new housing message and bill of the President. Mr. Klein is also quite correct I think in suggesting that we need a change in attitude about the slums.

After detailing some of the inadequacies and repercussions of the proposed housing bill, Mr. Klein asks what will it take to raise one-fifth of this nation out of *poverty*? Then he suggests a *change in attitude*, then the inadequacies of the *housing bill* in terms of what America can *produce;* then its *renewing our cities, job training* and *education* that he mentions and finally gets back to *public opinion*.

The title of the article was "Housing the Poor." Mr. Klein has wandered all over the field trying to support his contention that we need more units of low cost public housing from the congress. Yes, we need a change in attitude about the slums and some constructive and imaginative efforts at eliminating them as well as their root causes. A first step in changing public opinion must be sound programs, well thought

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HALTING THE ESCALATION

As an exercise in the possibilities of frustration, Vietnam is a stunning success. Perhaps the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese supporters have no sense of frustration. Yet it is hard to believe that they can be very happy about the mushrooming American intervention. Whatever their state of mind, however, there can be little doubt about the American sense of frustration. Nothing at all has really worked in South Vietnam, either politically or militarily. Politically, one regime has followed another; the advent of Premier Ky, a man of talents even more dubious than those of his predecessors, stands as a painful symbol of the political bungling and disarray. Militarily, the failure of the bombings of North Vietnam to make any noticeable difference in the course of the war shows graphically the make-shift nature of the power response.

In a situation where nothing in the past has worked, where nothing being tried at present is working and where nothing likely to be tried in the future promises to work, where does one go? The direction of the Administration, now patent, is to increase the commitment of ground troops, to continue aerial harassment and to live with whatever South Vietnamese government happens to be in power. To be sure, the Administration shows a willingness to probe for diplomatic openings, to keep looking for the glimmer of a political solution, but it hardly does so in an expectant mood. The thinking seems to be that somehow, someday, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam will grow weary of the whole business or be afflicted with a sudden onset of fear; then they'll be ready to talk. That strategy has all the appearances of a policy, if "policy" is defined as a mixture of strong talk, frenetic activity and wishful thinking.

The trouble here is that, bit by bit, the earlier emphasis on the necessity

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for a political solution is being pushed aside. Whether this is deliberate or not is hard to say; but the big talk these days is troop movements, strafing missions, Marine landings and "search and destroy" expeditions. The transition has been subtle, but unmistakable. Robert Kennedy, for one, has performed a useful service in pointing this out. More troops and more napalm bombs will not win the war in Vietnam. The point is obvious, trite and familiar—and, for that reason, easy to overlook in the colorful panoply of men, ships and planes.

Yet the understanding of this point requires, we believe, something more nuanced than the position expressed in the appeal issued by the "Clergymen's Emergency Committee for Vietnam" and printed on the back cover of this issue. Moral self-righteousness, whether from the left or right, merely clouds the issues: morality, yes; sheer moralizing, no. The problem in Vietnam has not been the absence of lofty American aspirations, as the signatories imply, but rather of aspirations unsupported by sufficient political intelligence and realism. Nor has the cause been an "unworthy" one; instead, it has been a cause undermined by a dearth of insight and consistency. It is terribly tidy to impute immorality to the Administration and to call, "in the name of God," for it to desist from its present course; but there have been no reports that God has revealed to anyone His plan for a Vietnamese solution.

More to the point is Representative Reuss' call for a U.N. role in Vietnam, spelled out on page 523 of this issue. He correctly points out that the failure of the Administration to take the issue to the U.N. evidences a "disrespect" for both the letter and the spirit of its Charter. The word "disrespect" is fitting here; it is not immoral *per se* for a nation to by-pass the U.N., but, by and large, it ill serves the cause of peace for a nation to do so. Of equal importance, the U.N. has demonstrated that it can effectively step in when the conditions are right; and that is one prime reason for its very existence. As Representative Reuss indicates, the U.N. is not likely to provide a magic solution. That is not necessary. What counts is that it be given a decent chance to muster its moral prestige and the intelligence of its members.

Already it is too late to talk about "escalating" the war in Vietnam. Escalation is now a given fact and the only remaining question is: how far will it go? To date, there are no indications that either side is willing to call a halt to its military activities. Three immediate steps are open to the United States to stop the escalation. First, to cease bombing North Vietnam; second, to announce a willingness to negotiate with the Viet Cong; and, third, to take the issue to the U.N.

MEDICARE PASSES

The Vietnamese war, and the rising criticism of the White House's handling of it, is overshadowing President Johnson's extraordinary achievement in domestic affairs. The Medicare bill, which has now passed both the House and Senate by lop-sided margins, is about to become law after more than a decade of political infighting. Yet the public reaction is far less intense than in the days when a passage of the bill was regarded as visionary, if not hopeless. There is no doubt something to the argument that Medicare's time has come, and that Mr. Johnson is reaping the benefit of a prolonged period of education begun by other men, but to leave it at that is to underrate the President's great political skills and his feat in bringing Medicare under the umbrella of consensus politics.

Medicare has been badly needed, and the need is based on the irony that medical science has succeeded brilliantly in prolonging life beyond the ability of many elderly Americans to afford it. Currently, despite private insurance programs and Kerr-Mills, old age for a considerable proportion of the population has been fraught with more anxiety, despite the growing national affluence and dramatic gains of medical science. The cost of sickness to those whose earning power is reduced or non-existent because of age can be ruinous. In fact, many of the elderly have frankly expressed a greater fear of surviving an expensive illness than of not surviving.

Surely the most affluent society the world has known can do better than this, and with the passage of Medicare is doing it. The attempts to tie payment of medical benefits to the recipient's income have been rejected by both Senate and the House—a key breakthrough. Benefits will come, not as aid to the indigent, but as a matter of right to those who have worked in covered employment and contributed to the plan over the years. The old means-test standard, which has for long been the fixed star for medical aid to the elderly, is not only an unwarranted assault on the dignity of prospective recipients; it also fails to focus on the problem of the

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In keeping with the usual practice, COMMONWEAL *will again appear on alternate weeks from the middle of July to the middle of September. Forthcoming issues will be dated August 6, August 20, September 3, and September 17. From then on, we will resume our normal weekly printing schedule.*

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elderly with some savings and some income who are also threatened by rising medical costs. They, too, are entitled to some security in their declining years, some insurance against the threat of illness erasing a carefully nurtured income that would otherwise suffice for a dignified retirement.

ARMED JUSTICE?

Bogalusa, La., is virtually under martial law and has been since the shooting of a white youth by a member of the Deacons for Defense and Justice, an armed Negro group organized to protect civil rights workers and Negro communities in Louisiana. The shooting occurred July 8, during a civil rights demonstration protesting police brutality. Three days later, on July 11, there were more police in Bogalusa than the citizens of that milltown of 27,000 had ever seen—and more Klansmen, pouring in from Alabama and Mississippi as well as from surrounding parishes.

The Deacons for Defense and Justice is a recent, but by no means surprising, phenomenon of the civil rights effort in the South. James Farmer, National Director of CORE and the leader of a Negro march on July 11, has admitted to a working relationship between his organization and the Deacons, saying ". . . if violence is on the horizon, I would prefer to see it channeled into a defense discipline."

For those who would like to see civil rights leave the streets and enter the courts, Bogalusa is a rude shock, connecting, as it implicitly does, violence with the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act. In this context, Farmer was very accurate in stating that Bogalusa would test President Johnson's sincerity in his declared war on the Ku Klux Klan, who apparently are as thick as the mosquitoes in the region. Previously in these columns we suggested that the President might better have demonstrated his resolve to curtail the Klan than by turning the investigation of its activities over to the House Un-American Activities Committee. Last word from that quarter is that the investigation is bogged down because of the oath of secrecy Klansmen take.

Now President Johnson has put forward the name of James P. Coleman, former governor of Mississippi, to fill a vacancy on the bench of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which carries the major load of civil rights cases in the South. Coleman is now being billed as a moderate; his record as a segregationist is unmitigated except, to quote the Washington *Post*, "he has never been an extremist." It is supposedly because of his lack of "extremism" that he was defeated by Governor Paul Johnson two years ago.

No doubt by the usual Mississippi standards Coleman is a moderate. But the Fifth Circuit, based in New Orleans, is in a bad way, moderately speaking. Of the eight Kennedy appointees to the district courts of Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi, four have been notoriously lax in enforcing civil rights legislation and the decisions of higher courts. Since their decisions are usually appealed, their major tactic has been one of delay.

Under these conditions, the appeals court is crucial. But of the nine members of that bench, only four consistently upheld Negro rights; two consistently opposed them, and the other three voted inconsistently. The administration of justice in the Fifth Circuit reflects the division, and "the principal cure," according to an article in the Yale Law School Journal (Nov., 1963), "must be found in the appointment of judges who will disinterestedly comply with decisions of higher courts."

Nobody can say how Coleman will act once he is on the bench, but from past experience there is no reason to be optimistic. In appointing him, Johnson is following the rule of Senatorial courtesy, by which Senator Eastland as a Senator from Mississippi has virtual veto power over appointees from his state. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he has much the same power over all judgeships. On the other hand, Johnson might have made his appointment to the Fifth Circuit a civil rights issue. It would have been extremely difficult for him to by-pass senatorial courtesy, but in this case it was worth a try. For until the administration of justice in the South is seen as primarily a civil rights issue, by many people the armed Deacons will be accepted as a necessary, if unfortunate, substitute. One shooting turned a town of 27,000 into an armed camp. What will more shootings do?

UNIVERSAL EDUCATION

A story in the New York *Times* for July 10 reports West Virginia's problems in dealing with a small college's creative approach to the public's demand for college degrees. The school is said to be selling the degrees for $50. Foreign degrees cost a little more.

This has the basic appeal of any trail-blazing venture, but we doubt that it will be enough to solve the problem. A better approach, we think, is the little-known one suggested years ago by a famous American educator, whose plan is to grant a B.A. to every American baby at birth. It could be affixed in the delivery room

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by the same nurse that supplies hospital identity tags. The advantages of this plan would be many. A bright high-school graduate could begin post-graduate college work right away, without the waste of four years spent elbowing his way past non-students who are interested only in a degree. No longer would young athletes have to risk life and limb for small pay in college football, merely to gain an empty B.A. Under the proposed plan, an empty B.A. would be his automatic birthright as an American. And why should the poor have to pay $50 or $100 to a West Virginia college for a proper ticket into the business world? As Everett Dirksen says, this is a land of equal opportunity. What better way to demonstrate it than to let everyone enter the marketplace on an equal basis, perhaps with his infant B.A. tattooed permanently on his checkwriting hand.

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

SUPERSONIC QUESTION MARK

The SST, the supersonic transport plane, is a striking example of technology slipping out of political control. To its proponents, this jet airliner that will fly 2,000 miles an hour, faster than the speed of sound, and cut the flying time from New York to Paris to three hours, is "the plane that gets you there before you left." To its opponents, it is an unsafe, uneconomic, unneeded vehicle that would cause far more problems than it would solve.

The chief advocates of the plane are the aircraft manufacturers who are looking for civilian business to take up the slack as the missile gradually replaces the manned bomber. Their self-interest, however, is intertwined with arguments of patriotism. The American aircraft industry now dominates the world market; three out of every four jets used in civilian traffic around the world are U.S.-produced. Foreign airlines in the past five years have bought more than $1 billion worth of jets from this country. Since the balance of payments is a serious preoccupation in the highest quarters in Washington, the foreign sales of the aircraft industry are a sizable consideration. Moreover, the industry, which has always had a symbiotic relationship with government, has become more dependent because only the U.S. Treasury can afford the research and development outlays to build the SST. To produce the first plane is likely to cost more than $1 billion. If the government encourages the present race between Boeing and Lockheed, two prototypes will be built and that estimate will double.

Preliminary designs for the SST have been on the drawing boards for nearly a decade. The project came alive in November, 1962, when Britain and France signed an agreement to work jointly in building such a plane. (Symbolically and optimistically, this joint enterprise was named Concorde.) The Anglo-French initiative aroused President Kennedy's competitive spirit. He directed then Vice President Johnson to head up a study committee. In May, 1963, the committee recommended that the U.S. proceed with building its own supersonic jet.

During the past two years, more committees have studied the question. The Government has expended $90 million for research and design work. This past month was to have been the time of decision. All signs pointed to President Johnson's taking not only an affirmative position on the whole project but also to his making a decisive choice between the two claimants, Boeing and Lockheed. The latter choice is important because if the Government could choose its prime contractor early enough in the developmental process, substantial savings could be made by avoiding duplication of effort. In selecting a successor to Najeeb Halaby as head of the Federal Aviation Agency, Mr. Johnson used as his principal criterion the ability to manage a large technical project. On this basis, he appointed to this normally civilian post, General William McKee who after a short, sharp skirmish in the Senate was confirmed. (No one disputed General McKee's ability, but some senators were resisting the appointment of a career military man to a civilian job, while others were fighting McKee in order to fight the SST.)

But the selection of Gen. McKee and Mr. Johnson's known earlier enthusiasm for the plane did not turn out to be accurate clues. The President's caution, an important if sometimes overlooked side of his personality, impelled him to temporize. Instead of aggressively championing the plane and choosing one firm to construct it, he ordered another eighteen months of research, design work, and the building of some parts but not of a whole prototype plane that could be flight-tested.

The President, who is devious and fond of mystification for its own sake, may be killing the project by

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stretching it out interminably (*Aviation Week* groaned that the SST was being "flogged to death with feathers") or he may be promoting it in a slow, crabwise fashion so as to disarm criticism and minimize the financial impact. The latter view is, in my judgment, probably correct. An important factor in his go-slow approach has been the distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of Defense Secretary McNamara. People may disagree about McNamara's political and strategic judgments in Vietnam, but few deny that he is an exceptionally capable manager of large technical projects who knows enough to ask many of the right, penetrating questions.

Technical Problems

On the technical side, there is first of all the question of safety. New airliners usually incorporate only one technical advance at a time. The SST necessarily consists of a dozen or more such advances, all experimental —until human passengers serve as flying guinea pigs. Moreover, military aircraft have often tried out the new ideas in aviation first. But there is no military forerunner for the SST.

B.K.O. Lundberg, director general of Sweden's Aeronautical Research Institute, pointed out in last February's *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*: "The SST's will operate at exceptional altitudes where atmospheric conditions are still largely unknown. Hail and rain may be present in clouds up to at least 75,000 feet. Collision with hail at supersonic speed can undoubtedly be catastrophic; even flying through heavy rain might be serious.

"The speed of the SST's will mean that the pilot can no longer rely on eyesight to avoid hail and rain, or other aircraft. So, for the first time in the history of transport passengers will be carried in a vehicle whose crew is virtually blind."

Lundberg also points to the danger from the sporadic bursts of radiation that come from solar flares. These flares occur so quickly that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to protect women of childbearing age, and particularly pregnant women, from radiation damage if they were passengers on the SST. Yet supersonic jets would have to fly above 50,000 feet where such flares are most intense.

In terms of social costs, two major issues exist. In the United States, four persons out of every five have never flown in an airplane. This great majority of taxpayers and citizens might prefer to have $1 or $2 billions or more of their public money spent on their schools or subway systems or some social purpose other than speeding a comparatively few businessmen and vacationers from New York to Europe three hours faster. The actual flight time, with its chance for a cocktail, dinner, and an hour or two of reading is pleasant enough. What is boring and wasteful is the time getting to and from airports and wrestling one's baggage. Perhaps the aviation planners ought to invest that $1 billion there.

Secondly, there is the depressing issue of the sonic boom. Many people think that a jet plane makes that dreadful noise only at the moment when it exceeds the speed of sound, that is, "cracks the sound barrier." But, in fact, a plane creates that noise throughout its entire flight, as long as it is going faster than sound, because it is constantly pushing a wave of air molecules that cannot get out of its way quickly enough. According to the Federal Aviation Agency, a supersonic jet flying from New York to Los Angeles would produce a sonic boom that would be heard by 60 million people in a coast-to-coast path 50 to 75 miles wide. And this extraordinary roar would be heard every hour or less as planes made their way overhead. Is it fair or equitable to ask 60 million people to suffer this additional nuisance so that 6 or 7 thousand people can save three hours?

William M. Allen, president of the Boeing Company, put the sonic boom issue in these rather unctuous terms last January 27 in a speech before the National Defense Transportation Association: "The altitude and distance to be acquired by the aircraft before emitting the pressure change effect will reduce the boom from the sharpness of a rifle crack to a sound of distant thunder. Admittedly there will be the question of public familiarization and acceptance of a new sound phenomenon, as has been the case in the past with other new applications of power."

In this same speech, Allen stated the case for the inevitability of technological change: "This fact must be kept in mind: when there is an advance in the so-called 'state of the art' in any given technology, it generates its own pressures. If we can demonstrate that a supersonic transport is a technically and economically feasible piece of equipment, we know that some one else, in Europe, or Russia, can do it also. Our technology has advanced into supersonic speeds. The SST has become inevitable."

The questions now before the country are: has the SST become inevitable simply because it has become technically possible? Is the role of the public in a democracy merely one of "familiarization and acceptance" or of independent analysis and judgment? The SST case has important implications for a free society in a technological age.

WILLIAM V. SHANNON

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COMPUTERIZED DIPLOMACY

When it is said that the Pentagon has taken over American foreign policy, the implied charge is that conservatives, militarists perhaps, men significantly outside the liberal American majority, dominate national policy. But this is not true. The charge that properly can be made against the Pentagon, or at least against the men who run the Department of Defense under Secretary McNamara, is that they uncritically accept the most simplistic assumptions of liberal America. These are men who anxiously talk of establishing world order, of reforming NATO or the U.N. to make a world government, of revised world systems which might stop nuclear proliferation and suppress conflict.

These men have a faith in the potentialities of reasonable action by reasonable men which in other circles today is held uneasily, if at all. Under the impact of the wars, ideological murders, and political nihilism of this century—a record since 1914 hardly to be matched in history—professional political men have been driven to attend to, if not to accept, the prophetic pessimism of Barth's and Tillich's views of history, of history as the record of human vanity and folly, or as the story of an estranged mankind's catastrophic encounters with reality.

The most important current in contemporary political thought has been pessimistic, and even those political professionals and scholars who reject historical pessimism have been influenced by it. Their own rationalist optimism, or socialism, or systems-interpretation and reformist programs, are tempered or qualified by the arguments pessimist theologians or stoic rationalists have made about the significance of what men and nations have done to one another since that seminal European autumn of 1914.

I say professionals and scholars, for these are issues of philosophy before they affect action. And while there is, I think, a very widespread public intuition of the risks of politics, it also is true that general American political discussion in the press, in public forums, in many schools, reflects an optimism that was comprehensible in Wilson's generation but now seems something like a neurotic formulation, a compensation for the repressed experience of the last half-century. Thus those in public discussion who dwell most on the possibilities of nuclear catastrophe are often advocates of the most simplistic programs for world political reform. And this must be said not only of the nuclear disarmament groups but of the Department of Defense—for the Defense managers, newcomers to politics, are orphans of that scientific optimism which was killed in our political culture by the wars of 1914-1918 and 1940-1945.

The Pentagon today is a triumph of the applied rationalism of modern American engineering: which is to say that mathematicians, scientists, accountants, and operations analysts have carried out an immense job of rationalization and have brought the huge American military establishment within a reasonable and consistent system of assignments, priority valuations, cost-effectiveness analyses, and systems organization and appraisals. For this achievement the McNamara Defense administration deserves all the praise it has been given.

The criticisms, though, point to something important. The management of a military establishment is a matter of units and quantities— of managing "bodies" and their equipment and supplies. The professional officer may justifiably complain that directing this establishment, commanding it in action, is something more than a managerial problem, and requires "great captains." But beyond this complaint is a still more important problem, that of the political policy which ought to govern military policy. After one of Mr. McNamara's disputes with the service staffs—over some such question as the Air Force's stubborn desire to have bombers to fly rather than mere missiles to man in holes in the ground—a friend of mine remarked bitterly that "McNamara can't even understand what makes an Air Force general tick; what makes him think he can understand Vietnam?"

That Vietnam is something Mr. McNamara and his staff are trying to understand is a result of their own drive, ambition, and self-confidence, but in part it is also a result of the effective collapse of State Department policy-making. There are brains and talent in the State Department, but they are buried in a badly-led department with low morale and little self-confidence. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have turned to the brilliant engineers of the Defense Department for policy because the Defense people knew what they were doing within the Pentagon and believed that the same talent and the same techniques could be applied to policy

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issues. If they could produce new and convincing solutions to the problems of nuclear deterrence and weapons-system evaluation and development, why shouldn't their techniques be turned to another area of problems where existing policies seemed unsatisfactory?

But in their confidence the Defense managers were wrong, and now it is coming home to the best men in the Department of Defense that the intellectual techniques which work with quantifiable problems which have objective values and defined parameters and criteria, are not working in the subjective, perverse, change and flux of the political arena. The McNamara team as a group are men of a scientific culture—they are of Pascal's "mathematical mind" rather than his antithetical "intuitive mind." They are essentially unpolitical in temper and perception, and they find the facts, the data, they receive on such problems as Vietnam to be, in the mathematical sense, "random" data. They are anxious and deeply troubled that they have been unable to find systems to organize this data into comprehensible patterns from which predictive conclusions can be drawn and manipulative techniques established. They have gone to the social sciences for help, but what they wanted were programs for engineering crisis policies; they have sought an engineering solution to Vietnam.

Without such solutions, Pentagon policy recommendations have been disjunctive and reactive, responding to successive specific situations. These are in part responsible for the erraticness of recent policy on Vietnam. Eight months ago we rejected overtures from North Vietnam for talks. Now we are anxiously pressing the Commonwealth nations, the U.N., and the neutrals to get Hanoi to negotiate. Four months ago we said that we would negotiate unconditionally, but our implied terms were very close to a demand for a Viet Cong surrender; and now this is no longer so. Two months ago we refused to talk with the Viet Cong. Now Mr. Bundy virtually has invited the Viet Cong to talk with us, asking only that its agents be supplied with North Vietnamese passports.

Action vs. Reaction

More than Pentagon influences have been involved in this inconstant line of action, but the Pentagon itself has shifted with each month's shift in the military situation. And there is little reason to think that—in or out of the Pentagon—there is any better definition of our long-range goals in Vietnam or of the long-range political constraints and opportunities which exist in that crisis than there was last November. Without defined objectives, the truth is that it is we who are reacting to the course of the Vietnamese crisis even though our air raids and troop commitments give us the illusion of dominating the crisis. It is the enemy, not we, who sets the pace, and the fact that our policy shifts with each passing month in response to the pressures and conditions of the war is proof of it.

So far as the Pentagon is responsible, the reason we lack a definition of goals is the Defense managers' disorientation in attempting to deal with the non-military elements in the Vietnamese problem. Without the power of political judgment that necessarily derives from generalized knowledge, experience, and intuition, the alternatives and policy "options" tend in Pentagon analyses to be defined mechanically, as lists of logical possibilities, implicitly of equal plausibility. The individuals and groups involved in a crisis tend to be defined in nominalist fashion; a pro-Western regime is just that, without any firm grasp of its motivations or internal dynamics. The enemy is an undifferentiated force, again without clearly perceived values, interests, or dynamics. Thus Communists are seen as incomprehensibly driven to fight freedom. But they are also peasants who were not given land reform by pro-Western governments. The North Vietnamese Communists support subversion in the south because they are members of a disciplined international movement directed by Peking (or Moscow). Yet the North Vietnamese leaders also hate China and can be swayed by propaganda which warns that the Chinese will take over their country. The Communists must be stopped in Vietnam or still other countries will fall to subversion. But the Vietnamese could also be reconciled and the war ended if only they could be brought to understand the individualist values of New England town meeting democracy. What we have in the Pentagon is an immensely sophisticated apparatus of military power and policy working on political assumptions of catastrophic triviality.

The Defense Department does not pose a rightist or militarist threat to American policy. The threat it poses is the threat of unanalyzed liberal cant earnestly and tirelessly and unskillfully applied to tormented and complex conflicts. If humiliations to the United States are the result of policy made in such a way, and blame is placed on the scientists, engineers and mathematicians of the Pentagon for having overreached themselves, what blame goes to the political professionals whose default made it possible—and even necessary for these men to deal with foreign affairs? The internal crisis in American national policy is more profound than the external.

WILLIAM PFAFF

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ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

BANNING THE BOMB

President Johnson may not be happy with him, but more power to Senator Robert Kennedy for urging the Administration to work harder for a treaty to check the spread of nuclear weapons. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of efforts to achieve nuclear control and eventual disarmament.

Nuclear proliferation is the big danger. It is only a matter of time until any small nation which really wants thermonuclear weapons can have them. A couple of months ago China exploded a second nuclear device, a fact that should be enough to give pause to almost anyone. Indeed, Britain's Minister for Disarmament recently warned the United Nations that failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons would raise the danger of their use by revolutionary groups intent on overthrowing the established government. Imagine nuclear weapons in the hands of every would-be Fidel Castro!

U.S. policy is opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons, to the point of offering our guarantee of protection to nuclear-less nations who feel threatened with nuclear blackmail by their neighbors. At the same time U.S. national policy on thermonuclear weapons has itself undergone a significant change, this one almost unremarked by the general public.

During the early Eisenhower years, national nuclear policy reflected the Wilson doctrine of a "bigger bang for a buck." This meant putting large sums and our major defense efforts into a big bomb policy, geared to the gospel of massive retaliation. In an effort to deter war, we pledged ourselves to all-out destruction of enemy cities if need be, while at the same time we sharply curtailed our ability to fight by more conventional means.

The bigger-bang-for-a-buck thesis should have outraged moralists, but not much was heard from them. Nonetheless, despite the silence of the theologians, we changed policy anyway, once the Communists showed us the futility of simply threatening to counter atrocity with atrocity. At that point we began to shift toward emphasis on our ability to fight limited wars with conventional weapons—as we are doing in Vietnam—operating under the general shield of nuclear power.

Then the year after President Kennedy took office, Defense Secretary McNamara took what was a very significant step. He told the Soviet Union, first of all, that we had the power to absorb a first strike and still hit back at either Russian cities or military targets and secondly, he pledged that if they would not hit cities, we wouldn't either. To my mind, this U.S. move represented a real step forward; in concrete terms it was estimated that a no-cities policy would save tens of millions of American and Russian lives. Yet in recent months Mr. McNamara has made it clear that he has now had to abandon his "no city" policy.

In his annual "military posture" statement to the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year, Mr. McNamara estimated that more than 120 million Americans would die in the event of a Soviet missile attack early in the next decade. If the Russian attack were limited to military targets, he estimated the American dead at 122 million out of a total population of 192 million. If the attack were to include urban centers, the death total could run to 149 million, Mr. McNamara said, and he made it clear that he now considers it "unlikely" that the Soviet Union would in fact exclude urban areas from any nuclear missile strike; for purposes of U.S. military planning, he said, the "no-cities" strategy has been abandoned.

I find this most discouraging. Mr. McNamara's original efforts to diversify our arms and lessen the risk of all-out nuclear war called for more, not less defense expenditures. I admired him for arguing his case before Congress and sticking to his guns. I admired even more his appeals to the Soviet Union on behalf of a no-cities policy. All this makes even more disappointing the fact that he feels compelled to abandon hope for this policy.

If the weeks that have gone by since Mr. McNamara's testimony are any guide, though, there will be precious little public discussion of this development. People are either so afraid of nuclear weapons that they don't want to talk about them or they count them so vast a problem that they consider it hopeless to even raise the question of Christian morality in connection with them. Yet both of these alternatives should be rejected. Enslavement must be resisted, but at the same time we must reject means that are themselves inhuman. We must keep the world from being devoured by the Communists, but we must also keep it from destroying itself. Vietnam is bad enough, heaven knows, but a nuclear war would make the fighting there look like a picnic.

JAMES O'GARA

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

LET THE U. N. HANDLE IT

Peace-keeping in Vietnam

HENRY S. REUSS

Despite the natural tendency to back the government's policy in times of foreign difficulty, many Americans are troubled about our role in Vietnam. True, few want to pull out and leave the 16 million South Vietnamese to Communist rule by force and terror. Rather, it is the manner in which the United States has engaged itself in Vietnam that produces the uneasiness.

The United States has acted unilaterally. It is a Western, and largely white nation, virtually going it alone in Southeast Asia in a war which is not manifestly, or wholly, a war against foreign aggression. The United States has placed itself in a position much too reminiscent of the French in their ill-considered effort to recolonize Indo-China after World War II.

Communist China is not directly involved in the conflict, and North Vietnam does its best to disguise and deny its involvement. On the other hand, the growing United States participation in what many Asians and others regard as primarily a Vietnamese civil war tends to excite fears of American "imperialism" and to corroborate China's claim to be the champion of "national liberation" in Asia. American leaders have continually pledged devotion to the United Nations as mankind's best hope of preserving peace. Yet we have signally failed to prove this devotion in Southeast Asia.

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In by-passing the United Nations, we are not only depriving ourselves of an opportunity to strengthen the moral, political, and military basis of our effort to preserve freedom of choice for the South Vietnamese. We are also exhibiting disrespect for the United Nations and are violating the letter as well as the spirit of its Charter, thereby undermining the peace-keeping capacity of the United Nations.

The primary purpose of the United Nations, as set forth in Article I of the Charter, is "to maintain, international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the preservation and removal of threats to the peace, . . ." By ignoring the United Nations in our Vietnam policy, we frustrate this purpose. More specifically, Article 37 of the Charter provides that the parties to any dispute which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security "*shall* refer it to the Security Council" if they fail to settle it by negotiation or other peaceful means. And if a veto blocks action by our Security Council, the General Assembly is empowered to take charge and make recommendations under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

The United Nations has acted honorably and effectively to help restore peace in other international conflicts, notably in Korea, the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus. There are obvious difficulties and limitations for the United Nations in any conflict involving great power. But great powers are no more exempt from the Charter than small nations. In the Korean

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invasion, the United Nations acted against North Korea, the agent of the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, the world organization embarked on peace-restoring efforts over the opposition of two permanent members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and France.

A Major Role

But prior to President Johnson's speech at San Francisco on June 25, spokesmen for the Administration consistently deprecated all suggestions that the United Nations should play a major peace-restoring role in Southeast Asia. They advanced three main arguments against a United Nations presence.

First, it was said that the U.N. could not play a useful role unless North Vietnam and Communist China agreed. This they obviously were not doing. North Vietnam's denial of the Security Council's competence to consider the Tonkin Gulf incidents last summer, and Peking Radio's condemnation of U.N. "meddling" were cited as evidence that the two Communist nations would not agree to a U.N. presence.

But the point is that their agreement is unnecessary. The idea that the criminal must assent to being restrained and hauled before the bar is as absurd in international peace-keeping as it would be in domestic law-enforcement. The United Nations did not seek the agreement of the North Korean aggressors before it acted in 1950. The existence or lack of North Vietnamese and Chinese acceptance of a U.N. role affects the manner in which the U.N. can operate, but it surely does not prevent it from operating.

It is equally irrelevant that neither North Vietnam nor Communist China is a member of the U.N. Article 2 of the Charter provides that "The Organization shall insure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security."

A second argument against bringing the Vietnamese conflict before the United Nations is that to do so might force the Soviet Union into a vigorous defense of North Vietnam and China. Not only might this prevent a possibly useful Soviet role as a behind-the-scenes negotiator in Southeast Asia; worse, it might harden up the entire post-Stalin, softer Soviet line.

In truth, the Soviet Union has been subjected to conflicting pressures over Southeast Asia. On the one hand, it has no desire to become involved in the risk of a mutually disastrous nuclear exchange with the United States over South Vietnam. On the other hand, it must publicly take an anti-United States position or court further erosion of its leadership position in the Communist world. Most likely, invoking the United Nations in Vietnam would have little effect on the Soviet Union's position. She would continue to fulminate publicly against the United States. But it is by no means clear that she would vote or act against a U.S. position which was genuinely restricted to preventing the subjugation of South Vietnam by force.

A third argument is that if the Vietnam issue were brought before the U.N., United States policy would come in for sweeping and damaging criticism. Too many nations, it is said, regard the Vietnam conflict not as aggression but as a conflict among two segments of the Vietnamese people.

The existence of such sentiments among the countries of the free world is, in fact, an argument *for* taking the Vietnam conflict before the United Nations. The United States should not and need not fear debate or the exposure of the facts. By ignoring the U.N. and avoiding debate, we allow suspicions and doubts about our policies and motives to grow. By going before the U.N., we can make our point that what is at stake is the independence of small nations.

The general assembly should respond to such an appeal. As Dag Hammarskjold observed, it is not primarily the great powers who have need of the United Nations' capacity to protect national security. They can take care of themselves. It is the small and weak that benefit most. And these nations, I think, if squarely presented with the question, will be unwilling to see the United Nations stand by idly while a small Asian nation is undermined and engulfed.

If the United Nations takes jurisdiction over the threat to world peace which exists in Southeast Asia, as the letter of the Charter provides, the United States will be better off no matter what the result. We will be better off because we will have shown that our words of devotion to the U.N. are meaningful. In short, if the United States will adopt in the U.N. a substantive position which stresses that our opposition is to violent change of government in South Vietnam (not to peaceable change brought about by U.N.-supervised free elections there), and if we present our case plainly and well, we stand to gain from U.N. debate much more than we stand to lose.

Voice in Congress

For the past year and more, a number of voices in Congress and in the country have been urging that the United Nations be brought into the Vietnam con-

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flict. Senator Frank Church of Idaho and Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska have spoken up in the Senate. I have taken a similar position in the House. Thoughtful students of international affairs, such as Benjamin Cohen, former counselor of the State Department and member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., have sounded the call for a U.N. presence in Vietnam. Last month the Democratic party of Wisconsin in its annual convention at Green Bay unanimously adopted a plank urging that "the United Nations be called upon to provide a presence in Southeast Asia, in order to pacify the area, conduct free elections, and sponsor its economic development."

Happily, President Johnson appears to have rejected the keep-the-U.N.-out school of thought in his speech commemorating the 20th anniversary of the United Nations on June 25 at San Francisco:

"I put to this world assembly the facts of aggression, the right of a people to be free from attack, the interest of every member in safety against molestation, the duty of this Organization to reduce the dangers to peace, and the unhesitating readiness of the United States to find a peaceful solution. I call upon this gathering of the nations of the world to use their influence, individually and collectively, to bring to the tables those who seem determined to make war. We will support your efforts, as we will support effective action by any agent or agency of these United Nations."

Those are fine words and a great step forward. But the speech was significant also for what the President didn't say. Two other things must be said, sooner or later: how the paralysis of the United Nations over the financial question can be resolved so that the U.N. can again act for world peace when it is called upon, and how the Vietnamese conflict is to be brought before the world organization.

The real barrier to United Nations action in Southeast Asia at this time is the financial question which has turned the General Assembly into a mere debating society, incapable of action and one step ahead of bankruptcy.

The Soviet Union has refused to pay its assessments for the United Nations' peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and in the Congo. France has refused to pay anything for the Congo operation, although it supported the Middle-East Force, even making voluntary contributions. The Soviet contention is that the assessments are illegal since both operations were authorized by the General Assembly and, in their view, this power is reserved to the Security Council under the Charter. The French argue that the General Assembly resolutions on financing are merely recommendatory. An opinion of the International Court of Justice, which held that the assessments for the two peace-keeping operations were "expenses of the organization" and therefore obligatory, has failed to shake the French and Soviet positions.

By the opening of the 19th General Assembly last December, both France and the Soviet Union owed more than two years' assessments and, under Article 19, were subject to the loss of their votes in the General Assembly. The United States was ready to invoke Article 19. Congress, with Administration encouragement, had pressed a concurrent resolution in August, 1964, calling on the permanent United States delegate to the U.N. to "make every effort to assure invocation of Article 19." Russia threatened to withdraw if deprived of its vote, and there was a good chance that France would do likewise, thus raising the specter of the United Nations' going the way of the League of Nations.

Descent Into Tragi-Comedy

The result, during the 19th General Assembly, was paralysis. A clear majority of nations was determined to avoid at all costs a vote that threatened to result in a disastrous showdown. They were afraid either to apply Article 19 or not to apply it, afraid of ousting Russia or of grievously offending the United States. So the world organization, set up to be an effective instrument to preserve the peace, dragged along in tragi-comedy.

To make an unavoidable decision between two contenders for a seat on the Security Council, the president of the Assembly held "consultations" in his office. "We go into the back room and vote and then say we have not voted," one delegate remarked. But this discreditable device would not work for the long agenda of items from a troubled world before the Assembly.

A special peace-keeping committee set up to solve the problem before the convening of the 20th General Assembly in September has done no better than the Assembly itself in breaking the impasse. A June 15 deadline for some resolution came and went.

By now it should be clear that the United Nations cannot gain by a confrontation that will result either in our defeat or in the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and France from the world organization. The United States should take the initiative in revitalizing the United Nations, based on the reality that as of today the major sovereign states simply will not be compelled to pay for peace-keeping operations which they consider harmful to their best interests. The United States

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should support the proposition that future peace-keeping operations be financed by voluntary contributions. In fact, only the Congo and Middle-East operations have been financed by the involuntary assessments that are at the center of the current controversy. More than a dozen U.N. peace-keeping operations, including those in Korea and Cyprus, have been financed by other means. As for the past, the United States, while remaining zealous to invoke Article 19 against countries in arrears in their regular U.N. dues, should not press Article 19 on the Middle-East and Congo special assessments.

If the 20th General Assembly is to be saved from the debilitating fate of its predecessor, the United States must act in the few weeks remaining before the Assembly convenes and Congress adjourns. Congress has to clear the way by passing a new resolution modifying Congress' injunction of last August to seek the application of Article 19. A new resolution, such as I introduced in April, should provide merely that the United States continue efforts to obtain the payment of arrears by negotiation, with the hope that some scheme of voluntary contributions will prove acceptable once the attempt to require payment is abandoned. With the United Nations revivified, the way will be open for the Vietnam conflict to be brought before it. President Johnson has already declared our willingness to "support" any U.N. action. There remains the question of who will initiate the consideration of such action.

I would hope that one of the small powers which have the most to gain from the strengthening of U.N. security operations—an Ireland, Austria, Israel, or Costa Rica—would take the lead. If not, I believe the United States itself must raise the matter before the U.N. A U.N. peace-keeping operation authorized by the General Assembly can be supported by the voluntary contributions of willing members, according to the Korean precedent.

The precise form of the U.N. operation will depend upon the circumstances at the time and the response of the North Vietnamese and their Chinese backers. Action by the United Nations calling for a cease-fire and negotiations, either at a reconvened Geneva conference or in a new setting, is a first step. The United States must assert its willingness to abide by a properly supervised cease-fire. If the Communists refuse such a cease-fire, a U.N. peace-keeping force should be stationed both on South Vietnam's borders to prevent further infiltration of men and arms from the North, and within South Vietnam itself. Undoubtedly, the United States would have to supply the lion's share of the troops and money for the operation, as in Korea. But we would still benefit, since our costs would be less than if we continue to act virtually unilaterally, and since the force would be operating under the moral umbrella of the United Nations.

As pacification of South Vietnam progressed, the United Nations would be in a far better position than the United States to assist in the development of the country without any stigma of colonialism, and to supervise an eventual plebiscite in which the people of South Vietnam could freely choose their own form of government. For our part, we would have to announce our readiness to abide by that result even if it might mean the submersion of South Vietnam into North Vietnam.

Bringing the United Nations into Vietnam is not a cure-all or an easy solution. As the mainstay of a U.N. operation, the United States will continue to be confronted with hard tasks in Vietnam. But invoking the U.N. would strengthen our military, moral, and political posture in Southeast Asia and help build the peace-keeping precedents of the U.N. There is much to be done after San Francisco. But the foundation is laid.

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RONALD MORAN

SO SIMPLY MEANS THE RAIN

This too many times: the drought
choking bream, loosing the
terrible thirst the chinch bug
saves for St. Augustine root.
Working by day you can forget.

At night you can almost mark
an insect's brittle death,
the rasping song, or feel
the tremble of an earthworm
coiling up for fragile dew,

the wet temptress, beguiling.
I know the law and measure out
my thirst in quarts,
yet at night I would turn
the sprinkler on, imagine rain,

and embrace the wet
and welcome into my ring
all the world's thirst,
and thus rejoice:
so simply means the rain.

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How self-interest saves idealism

WHY THE U. N. SURVIVES

STEPHANIE HARRINGTON

The United Nations' twentieth birthday party in San Francisco was a perfunctory and spiritless affair. It seemed, The New York *Times* reported, "as if the United Nations, instead of carrying the world's hopes as it did in 1945, had matured uncertainly and been placed on the defensive in a critical point of history."

Peace and humanity are under daily assault in Vietnam and the United Nations is powerless to intervene. Self-determination—indeed the very principle of morality in international relations—is being trampled in the dusty streets of Santo Domingo by the most powerful member of the United Nations, and it can do no more than send in a team of observers. And when U.N. Secretary General U Thant—who has not only the capacity but the responsibility to view international crises with a more objective eye than most—had the temerity to suggest that the American people may not be getting all the facts about Vietnam, the American government responded with a contemptuousness that gave little heart to those who count on the prestige of the world organization and its Secretary General as vital factors in the struggle for peace.

By the same token, even U Thant himself contributed to the current mood when, speaking before a conference of non-governmental organizations in May, he remarked that "the first few months of 1965 have not given any ground for optimism—not only in relation to the future functioning of this organization, but also in relation to the general picture of international relations in terms of the provisions of the Charter." And underlying all this has been the U.N.'s basic financial insecurity engendered by the bitter dispute over assessments for peace-keeping operations.

But doubts and depression about the U.N.'s capacity to function successfully are not new. And, in fact, it may be just this kind of persistent pessimism that provides a key to intelligent optimism about the U.N.'s usefulness.

To plumb all this dispair to find the locus of hope requires cynicism and belaboring the obvious. The obvious, cynical and very basic truth that so far has determined the nature of the U.N. is that the world has been and still is run by power politics. In San Francisco Thant observed that "the concept of power politics, whether as the instrument of nationalism or of ideological extremism, is the natural enemy of international order as envisaged in the Charter."

This judgment is certainly accurate, but it fails to point out that the Charter contains the seed of this inimical concept within itself. Article 2 of the Charter contains the principle of "the *sovereign* (italics mine) equality" of all U.N. members. And, as in relations between sovereign nations, i.e., nations which relinquish none of their power, those with the most power prevail, so in an organization of sovereign states the same power principle operates. Indeed, the founding fathers of the U.N. very cynically (and I use this term positively) incorporated this principle into the structure of the U.N. They made the Security Council the effective authority for any use of force by the U.N. and saw to it that the Council would be dominated by what were in 1945 the five great world powers, whose sovereignty would be guaranteed by the veto. Thus, from the controlling heights of the Security Council, the great powers would be, within the U.N. as without, more equal. This arrangement reflected the realization that if the actions of the U.N. did not have the support of both major power blocs the organization could not function.

Unanimity: Right and Duty

Anthony Eden recalled in The New York *Times* recently the words of a fellow drafter of the Charter, Jan Christiaan Smuts:

"They [the great nations] have the power, and must in the first place bear the responsibility for using that power to prevent war . . . Yalta has added the further corollary of unanimity among them to this special function for peace imposed on them. There is thus the further obligation of unity of decision place and action placed on them; in action, in enforcement measures for preventing war they must be unanimous and act, or not act, together . . . The habit of cooperation among

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them may be expected to create trust and dispel suspicion between them. But who, with knowledge of the divisions of the last quarter of a century, and their dire results, and with thought of the possibilities of mischief in the years before us, will venture to say that such drastic provision for unity is not necessary today? We know that unanimity is at present insisted on, and moreover, the right of unanimity now asked may come to operate as a duty to unanimity . . ."

The duty to unanimity does not yet operate in the consciences of the great powers, now reduced to two with China as potential third. And some may say that the right to unanimity—less euphemistically, the right of any of the onetime "Big Five" to use its veto to block a decision it opposes—has reduced the effectiveness of the U.N. It has, they say, forced Russia and the United States to bypass the U.N. (except perhaps for informal discussions) in crises like those in Hungary, Vietnam and the Dominican Republic because neither wants to allow the other a veto—or even a forum—in matters that affect its vital interests. And, this argument continues, since the primary objective of the U.N., as set out in its Charter, is to keep peace; and, since those crises that most directly threaten the peace are precisely those that Russia and the United States will not allow the U.N. to settle, the big powers have rendered the world organization useless.

Another hypothesis, however, is that rather than damaging the U.N. by bypassing it where unanimity was impossible, the big powers have in so doing saved it, since misuse—as when the Russians' abuse of the veto turned the Security Council proceedings into a farce—can be potentially more destructive than disuse. Maintaining the U.N.'s prestige by not involving it in areas where it cannot prevail is a consideration of which member states and the Secretary General have been keenly aware. And while this is a consideration that is sometimes used disingenuously to keep the U.N. from interfering with national policies and one that flows from the dominance of power politics, the attention that has been paid to it gives some evidence of a will on the part of Russia and the United States to spare the United Nations from their power. Just as the U.N. survived its disuse in the Hungarian crisis and in the Cuban missile crisis (in which it was merely a forum and not a decisive factor), so it will survive its disuse in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

A Cynical Survival

The reason it will survive is simple. The big powers want it to survive. And here is the source of cynical optimism. They may not want it to survive because they are concerned about the principles of the Charter, they may be preserving it selfishly only to try to use it as an instrument of their own national foreign policies, but they *are* preserving it. President Johnson may have had nothing of substance to say when he addressed the U.N.'s twentieth anniversary meeting, but he did make the trip to San Francisco to pledge this country's allegiance to the world organization. The Russians, like us, still use the Security Council to propagandize, but they no longer obstruct it as they once did. And it now seems that there will be tacit cooperation among the U.N.'s members, big and small, to end the paralysis caused by the organization's financial impasse.

Indeed, this internal crisis over payments for peacekeeping operations that threatened to wreck the U.N. may be so resolved that it will prove to be a significant step in transforming the "right to unanimity" into a conscious recognition of the "duty to unanimity." If so, it will stand as heartening evidence that the U.N., just by existing, by being preserved as a catalyst, a conscience, a forum and even an irritant, can encourage steps—though they be baby steps—toward international cooperation. It also provides an available structure for the cooperation whenever the spirit proves willing.

A member of the U.S. mission to the U.N., pointing to the U.N.'s development projects, indicated that the United States would "not oppose" the idea of an independent U.N. force with a capacity to act quickly—which also suggests that rather than let the U.N. drown in its troubles, including those troubles caused by the United States, this country would, over the lung run. like to see the world organization strengthened. President Johnson corroborated this in his San Francisco speech, when he said: "Where the United Nations requires readily available peace forces in hours and days and not in weeks or months, let all pledge to provide those forces. And my country is ready." The president also reaffirmed that the primary purpose of the U.N., not only as set out in the Charter but as recognized, at least rhetorically, by one big power, is to maintain peace.

This is significant since there are those who, despairing that the U.N. can ever function effectively as the international keeper of the peace, are now saying that it should devote itself primarily to development projects such as that for the Lower Mekong basin in the hope that through promoting cooperation among and improving the lot of the underdeveloped nations they would indirectly prevent conflicts from erupting. This is certainly a worthwhile aim for the U.N., but to make such projects its first concern is to deny that the

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U.N. can fulfill its first and foremost obligation as defined in its Charter.

A Means, not an End

The same member of the American mission also talked of the U.N. as "the best instrumentality we have to seek peaceful solutions in an atomic period." The word "instrumentality" is important, for that is just what the U.N. is— a means to an end and not an end in itself. And it is precisely those critics of the U.N. who point to the organization's impotence in this or that situation and call it worthless or who see member nations using the U.N. to further their own interests and call it corrupt—it is precisely these so-called tough-minded cynics who are naive. The real cynics are those who maintain their faith in the U.N. because they understand that it is an instrumentality to be *used* by nations toward a greater end—a world order in which sovereignty is sacrificed for the good of the whole international community.

They know that by the nature of things this end can only be achieved at that distant point in the future at which nations recognize that their best interests (perhaps their very survival) depend on not the retention but the sacrifice of their sovereignty. Believers in this cynical possibility understand that there will be many more ugly crises before the nations of the world are ready—if they will ever be—to accept this premise. They also understand that if this moment comes it will come only through the realization that the path of self-interest is the path to a true parliament of man. So they do not despair when the U.N. is turned into a marketplace for nationalist policies and propaganda. They expect it. And they recognize that the fault is not with the instrumentality but with the nations who are not yet ready to make proper use of it.

As U Thant said in San Francisco: "If we want some better system for peace and security than an unsteady balance of nationalistic power and aspiration, we have got to work long and hard to remove the many obstacles in the way, and in that process develop a new system of relationships between states which really corresponds to present needs and conditions." And the important thing is that when nations are ready to develop this new system, the means to develop it, the "instrumentality" will be there. That is why the commitment of the big powers to keep the U.N. in existence is hopeful.

Indeed, if the U.N. were to become a power in its own right that could compete with the great national powers, it would have subverted the principles of its Charter. That it is why prestige is not a paramount consideration in assessing the organization. The minute the big powers decide to use it for the purposes set forth in the Charter, the U.N. will automatically be invested with enormous prestige. It is basically not important—though it is certainly ill mannered—if a big power sometimes treats the Secretary General with condescension, as the United States treated U Thant when he made his suggestion about Vietnam. It would be dangerous, however, if a Secretary General acquired so much prestige and power that Russia or the United States might regard him as a threat to their national interests.

This actually did happen in 1960 when Khrushchev felt that the Soviet Union's interests were threatened by Dag Hammarskjold's vigorous exercise of the Secretary Generalship and nearly destroyed the organization with his demands for a "troika." Hammarskjold was probably a stronger, and perhaps in that sense, a more prestigious Secretary General than Thant. But Thant's more low-key generalship has been more consonant with the Charter and more in line with the only kind of role that is really *possible* for the U.N. This is borne out by the fact that the office of Secretary General, since Thant has held it, has become secure once again from such threats as the "troika" proposal. No one at the U.N., neither the Americans nor the Russians, would like to see Thant leave (as from time to time he intimates he might) and disturb this feeling of security by bringing in a new man, an unknown quantity. One Middle Eastern delegate observed that Thant is a Bhuddist and that his philosophy of quiet diplomacy is worlds apart from that of Hammarskjold, who, the delegate went on, was "more of an activist with whom there was an undertone that the U.N. was a power." Thant is performing the vital function of keeping the U.N. intact, holding it in trust, as it were, for those future generations who might have the will to use it to achieve the goals of the Charter. Were Hammarskjold still Secretary General, the delegate speculated, he might be putting "pressure on the safety valve." And too much pressure on this safety valve might lead the big powers to close it.

If we can only approach the U.N. with less of the kind of idealism that breeds disillusion and more of the kind of cynicism that recognizes possibilities, we can stop eyeing it like a barometer in a hurricane. There is no need to despair because the U.N. and its Secretary General are used, sometimes disdainfully, as pawns in the age old contest of power. As long as individual powers find it useful, the U.N. will be preserved, and as long as it is preserved it may some day be used for the right purposes.

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When does renewal become heresy?

THE SPECTER OF MODERNISM

JOHN RATTE

Modernism is still a word to conjure with in the Church. There has not been a major new idea in the last fifty-odd years which has not seen the term, either in its substantive or adjectival form, dusted off and sent into action. Biblical students in Jerusalem, paleontologists in Peking, worker-priests in Paris, and all lay theologians *ipsi per se* have at one time or another been castigated as "crypto-modernists"—a phrase which has the same power to mislead the un-historical imagination as does the phrase "Underground Railroad," suggesting vast subterranean caverns in which legions of faithless priests, excommunicated but clinging to their clerical dress, burrow diligently into seminary boiler rooms and parochial basements, spreading relativism, historicism, immanentism, and revolt.

The term "modernist" was current, and usually condemnatory, at the turn of the century, and in the years before the First World War. It was used fairly indiscriminately for a multitude of movements: poetry after Rimbaud and Baudelaire, painting after the *Fauves* and the impressionists, certain schools of philosophy and psychology, were all attacked by the academic or orthodox in each field as "modernist." The common practice was to lump ideas together and see an "ism," a general ideology, as well as several discrete individuals and their creations. The same was true for religion, but it was in religion that the term stuck. Students of the modernizing, or "modernist," tendencies in Anglicanism and other more theologically self-conscious Christian churches, as well as in Roman Catholicism, took to writing articles and books in which the "modernist" impulse was traced back to Voltaire, then to Erasmus, and finally, to Abelard. Today the term is generally reserved to the historian of ideas who employs it to refer exclusively to intellectual or artistic movements at the turn of the century: for to say that T. S. Eliot *and* Ginsberg, or Picasso *and* Pop are "modernist" is to say nothing at all.

But the habit of using the same term to describe men who are young in 1965 as was used to describe men who were old in 1907 persists in the Church, though now mostly *sub rosa*. The sad fact remains that the very word modernism—usually with a capital M—can still bring blood to boil in the hearts of both official and unofficial watchdogs of the Lord: it has the same inflammatory potential as "un-Americanism."

Of course there was such a thing as modernism, and there may still be such creatures as heretics. Many of the ideas generated by the modernist crisis were heretical in so far as they directly or indirectly challenged the fundamentals of Christian belief—whether these fundamentals be understood propositionally, as dogmas defined and clarified by the magisterium of the Church, or simply as mysteries available and necessary for salvation. The Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the very historicity of God's dealing with men before and after the preaching of His kingdom by Jesus Christ were either directly abandoned, or qualified out of existence by men who (and here is one of the paradoxes of the modernist movement) were desperately trying to make Christianity relevant to the modern world.

In this sense the heretical nature of modernist ideas must be clear to even the most theologically careless of Christians, even more so today than in 1907. Modernism was not a problem solely for the Catholic Church, but, as its most eloquent figure, George Tyrrell, pointed out, it was a challenge to all Christian sects, and potentially, for Judaism and Islam as well. For the broad and uncritical evolutionary view of the history of religion into which modernist insights tended to dissolve challenged the historical meaning of *all* religions. While recognizing all religions as historical phenomena, this view tended to evaluate them in so far as they contributed to the progress of the religious consciousness of humanity. The religion with the most humanity—and history—in it stood at the top. Modernism was quite hierarchical and discriminating in this classification, with Catholicism ranked first, at least potentially, as a suitable universal expression of the divinity of man. But at the same time it was absolutely egalitarian and un-discriminatory in denying the knowledge and experience of a transcendent God to all religions. The modernists denied the specifics of traditional Christianity. They tended, in

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thinking about the history of dogma, to go beyond Newman's theory of development to evolutionary relativism. But the modernists were condemned as heretics for other reasons than their heresy.

They were condemned because they challenged the absolutely unchanging character of the teaching authority of the Church. They were condemned because they preferred the notion of a Church learning to that of a Church teaching from a body of dogma fixed forever not merely in its content, but in its mode of expression and the modes suitable for its explication and interpretation as well. They were condemned because they would not submit to a theology of disputation, arguing that there were other ways of presenting Christian belief to the modern world, ways which would recognize the revolutions through which philosophy had passed since the sixteenth century: Kant, Hegel, the neo-Kantian movement, pragmatism, psychologism, and the rest. They were condemned, in short, because they were reviving again, in more dangerous form, the proposition which had already been condemned in 1864 in the *Syllabus of Errors,* i.e., that the Catholic Church should accommodate itself to the modern world.

It is modernism defined as a heresy in this larger sense which still troubles the sleep of liberal and conservative alike. And it must be clear immediately that if these ideas still stand condemned, then liberal and conservative, existentialist and propositionalist alike are modernist through and through. And at least two popes with them. If modernism is understood not as the synthesis created in the papal documents which condemned the movement (it *was* a synthesis), and not as the specific and clearly heretical writings of a Loisy (they *were* heretical), and the more ambiguous enthusiasms of a George Tyrrell, but rather as as a broad tendency to bring Catholic Christianity "up to date," to give it force and meaning, then the Church of Vatican II is in error, and the fundamental notion of the Mystical Body is flawed. For that was the meaning that the term had in 1907, for those who condemned it.

It would seem clear, then, that we had best leave the term to the age for which it had meaning, and to the Church historian, and to make some attempt to understand specifically what the modernists were trying to do. First, they were trying to put Catholicism in touch with the modern world created by the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century positivism by presenting a kind of Catholicism which seemed to harmonize with modern science and with modern political and social ideas. Secondly, they were trying to reform the Church from within so that the image would be a true one. They failed on both counts. They failed to make Catholicism palatable to late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe in terms of reason because they put forth their arguments at a time when the idea of reason was coming under fire by advanced thinkers in all fields of secular learning. They failed to reform the Church from within because they attacked the dominance of rationalism in theology and of strict hierarchy and organization in both religious and secular Catholic life at the very moment when Thomism was finally accepted, in its pure form, as the official philosophy of Roman Catholicism, and when the Church was making elaborate and unnecessary attempts to argue, often on scientific grounds, the compatibility of revelation and science through reason.

Anti-Intellectual Rationalists

If this strikes the reader as something of a paradox, he may find consolation in the fact that Pius X and his theologians were similarly puzzled in drawing up the condemnations of the movement. These were largely synthesized out of the writings of the French biblical critic Alfred Loisy, and the English social theorist and Jesuit, George Tyrrell. At one point in the encyclical letter in which the heresy was described and analyzed, *Pascendi,* the modernists are condemned as "anti-intellectualists"; elsewhere it is remarked that "there is no surer sign that a man is tending to modernism than when he begins to show his dislike for the scholastic method." Yet repeatedly the encyclical, in commenting on the agnosticism, the psychologizing, and the mania for historical criticism of the movement, condemned its leaders as "rationalists."

One can only sympathize with the difficulty which was faced by the contemporaries of the movement—both its friends and its critics—in trying to pin it down. Characteristics of the ambiguity generated by this double task was the frequent use of pseudonyms, and the careful disguising of revolutionary ideas in the language of strict orthodoxy. Loisy's famous *The Gospel and the Church* was the classic example of this duplicity: apparently an attack on the liberal Protestant Harnack, the book went him one better in thrusting the "essence" of Christianity back before the composition of the gospels themselves.

In both the matter of their double goal, and in the matter of technique, the modernists were in a situation strikingly different from that of today's critics and reformers within the Church. As far as I know, even the most outspoken of the new generation, cleric or layman, in Europe or America, with the exception of Xavier Rynne and Michael Serafian, speaks in his own name.

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Moreover, the state of all the topics about which the contemporary Catholic thinker writes has altered in a revolutionary fashion, as has the attitude of the non-Catholic world to the Church. If he discusses the implications of biblical criticism for the contemporary Church, its structure, its liturgy, he does so on the basis of Catholic and Protestant scholarship far advanced both in substance and technique from that of Loisy's day. If he argues about the psychology of belief he has more than William James to work with.

Moreover, the critic—liberal, reformer, call him what you will—follows, rather than leads the papacy in calling for *aggiornamento*—which might be loosely translated as modernizing, if not modernism. And if he comes to doubt the realities of Christianity— that God acts in history, and has acted in Jesus Christ for our salvation, and that His action can be known—he has the good sense to get out of the Church, or at least to shut up. He has no desire to present a "rational" Catholic Christianity to a scientific world which has gone far beyond a simple positivist notion of an orderly universe utterly open to man's intellect, and even less inclination to retreat into a vague immanentism which substitutes inward promptings for the historical and personal reality of Jesus Christ. Least of all does he seek to defend the universal church as a kind of idea-proof shelter for the "faith of the simple believer," as some of the modernists did.

Put simply, the Church to which he belongs, and which he seeks to understand and renew, is not the same Church that the modernists challenged, and from which they were excommunicated. Most, if not all of the things for which the modernists agitated, of which they dreamed, are taken for granted today. They did not care for liturgical reform, or for ecumenism: but they called for a full acceptance of biblical science, and we have *Divino Afflante Spiritu.* The Italian, or social, wing of the Church called for social democracy, and for an end to clerical aloofness, and we have *Mater et Magistra* and the indelible image of Pope John. They pointed to achievements of Protestant theology, and we have today the phenomenon of the gradual breakdown of the barriers between Catholic and Protestant in both the scientific and interpretive study of Scripture. We have Küng: and thereby we have Barth.

I think it is significant that whereas today the task of articulating reform and renewal in the Church is the shared work of clergy and laymen, with one or two major exceptions the modernists were priests, the movement purely clerical. These men were convinced that there was little time left to the Church: they felt that Rome, triumphal, remote, irrelevant, could no longer continue to hold up those baroque dikes of order and constraint erected to keep the flood tide of modernity from the faithful. They could expect no help from an intelligent and active laity. They could expect no sympathy from the outside world. They felt that the forms of Catholicism must be preserved, the inner reality transformed, perhaps ultimately, de-Christianized, if that was necessary to satisfy both science and the longings of mass society for human solidarity: and they saw the pastoral vocation in providing that satisfaction. It is perhaps the greatest of the paradoxes of the movement that a group of priests should be in part led by their own mistaken notions of the "scientific" character of higher criticism, in part pushed by a curia unmindful of the responsibility for human kindness and freedom which the possession of the magisterium entails, to abandon the first Priest in an effort to preserve His flock. It was once, but it is no longer, a "modern" temptation.

The Ingredients of Reform

Looking back at the modernist crisis from the perspective of almost sixty years—from the splendid vantage-point of the achievement of Pope John, and the promise of Pope Paul and Vatican II—one is more inclined to sympathize with the heretic than with his orthodox judge, especially since the modernists were so harshly treated and the danger of the spread of modernist ideas was so vastly overrated. The modernists were trying to invent a recipe for change in the Church in the twentieth century. They had enough ingredients: social reform, higher criticism, seminary reform, Bergsonian philosophy—to make a whole cook book of reform. Some of them ended up succumbing to the very watered-down liberal Protestantism they sought to combat. Others tried to make use of the beginnings of intuitionism in philosophy for an understanding of dogma, and finished with neither philosophy or religion. It was, especially for their time, a nearly hopeless task.

Of course one may differ with this estimate: but in any case the evaluation must be an historical one; which means that it must always remember that the modernists are dead, and so are many of the issues on which they spent their hope and lost their faith. But we are still left with the interesting and difficult question: what happened *between* modernism and *aggiornamento*?

Estimating the modernists in the perspective of Vatican II is a complex process. The problem of sorting out what was constructive from what was destructive in modernism can be done fairly easily from our

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vantage point *if* we limit ourselves to the operation of comparing, point by point, the thought of the leading figures of the movement with the particulars of the movement of reform and renewal in the Church today. For instance, the general modernist insistence that the *forms* in which the Church gave expression, in each age, to the truths of Revelation and tradition, should be appropriate to that age, relevant to its concerns, and expressed in its rhetoric, is certainly a root principle of the Church today, in theology as well as in liturgical reform. But the *reductio ad absurdum* of this approach to reality (which was after all that of the apostolic, patristic, medieval and Baroque Church) is complete dogmatic relativism: and that position is if anything more untenable in 1965 than it was in 1905.

Many other, less general examples can be given. George Tyrrell was a great enthusiast for the little brick chapels which brought Methodism into the daily lives of Christian workers: using them as an example, he argued for an intensely social Catholicism. In an age of urban renewal, store-front churches, and the agonizing re-appraisal of the forms of parish life, Tyrrell's enthusiasm seems commendable. And of course what was for English modernism merely a side light was almost the whole of the movement in Italy. The Italian modernists agitated for an end to clerical luxury and remoteness from the real life of the laity and for greater participation by the laity in political life. Even the most extraordinary of their criticisms and demands seem weak in an age that has seen Christian Democratic parties rule all the major countries of Europe—and as conservative regimes at that—and has Paul VI and Pietro Nenni meet. Again, there is much consideration being given today to seminary reform: Loisy, Tyrrell, and the leading American modernist, William Laurence Sullivan, all suffered from the style of seminary training of their day, criticized it, and argued that the Church was doomed to either faithless functionaries or pious but mindless automatons unless reform came quickly. Their language was harsh, but their suffering was great.

The more difficult operation is to try to trace influences from the modernists on down, and to date this has not been done. However, I think it is safe to say that the main influence the modernists had on the two generations of theologians, biblical critics, liturgists, and social reformers was negative: they were an example of how *not* to proceed. In this sense the modernists had a good effect, and the same might even be said of the fanatical anti-modernists, known as integrists, from their insistence on an "integral" Catholicism. For both the heresy, and the personal and ideological excesses of the counter-heresy of integrism, which were chastized in 1914 by Benedict XV, forced those who would work for a meaningful reconciliation of the Church with modern life and thought to deepen their scholarship, broaden their understanding of, and enthusiasm for, Protestant thought (the modernists were much like the rest of the nineteenth century Catholicism in the polemical approach to Protestant Christianity), and most importantly, learn those rich but difficult languages, clarity, persuasion, humility and delay.

The final assessment of the relationship of modernism *then*, to the modern Church *now*, must wait on the various studies of the major figures now under way. (Books are planned by European scholars on Loisy, Tyrrell, von Hügel: we already have the first tome of an excellent study of the central years of the movement by the French scholar, Emile Poulat.) It is clear, however, that this assessment will have to take into account the general history of Europe in the twentieth century if it is to be an accurate one. Modernism was a sign of the Church "awakening from an intellectual sleep which had lasted well over a hundred years," and the broad history of ideas suggests that excesses of vigor, followed by a tendency to relapse into inaction are inevitable at such moments of re-awakening. But at the very moment when the extremes had exhausted themselves—that is, in 1914, when Benedict said ". . . no individual has the right to put himself forward, in books, articles, and speeches, as being a master of the Church. On questions on which the Holy See has not yet decided and when the pros and cons of various opinions can be discussed without detriment to faith and morals, anyone may express his views and defend them. . . ."—at that moment the age of total war began, and the intellectual processes of Europe slowed, to revive fitfully, brilliantly, briefly in the '20's and '30's.

The energies of the papacy, and of the national churches, were fully absorbed by war, reconstruction, political maneuver with the totalitarian regimes, and then war and reconstruction again. In a sense, then, 1944 was another 1914: the intervening years were seed-years when the men who are our 20th century doctors—Adam, Congar, deLubac, Rahner, Teilhard and the rest—did their work, building on the great achievement of Newman, without whom little good—or bad—could have come about.

Events outside the Church—in that world which the Church is meant to enlighten—conspired to break the organic process of revolution, reaction, and true renewal which modernism initiated, setting an hiatus of a generation between the second and the third stages. The evolutionary process now goes on.

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FLIGHTY MOVIE

THE SCREEN

As another item in the one-man's-meat discussion of comedy films, I find myself practically alone in my lack of enthusiasm for "Those Magnificent Men in Their Flying Machines—Or How I Flew from London to Paris in 25 Hours and 11 Minutes." It is only fair to say, however, that my interest in airplanes is mainly limited to their ability to get me from one place to another. So it's hardly surprising that I couldn't warm up to this overly-long, 133-minute opus about 1910 aircrafts and their fliers. Producer Stan Margulies and director Ken Annakin use many cinematic devices and comedy tricks to hold their audience; and most viewers will no doubt be held—by the starry international cast, by the vintage flying contraptions that look as if they're made of sticks, wire, cloth, and glue but also look authentic as they glide through the air, and by the comedy which ranges from satire and caricature to wild slapstick.

The story, about a 1910 London-to-Paris air-race sponsored by a newspaper publisher (Robert Morley), is rather thin, but some of its embellishments prove entertaining. Morley, who has offered a 10,000-pound prize and expects the young Guardsman (James Fox) who is courting his daughter (Sarah Miles) to win, laments that "the trouble with these international affairs is that they attract foreigners." It is the foreigners, however, in this British comedy who give further opportunity for burlesque types: Gert Frobe as an old-fashioned Prussian determined to win and flying strictly by the book of instructions; Italian Alberto Sordi as the unrestrained, lovable family man accompanied by his wife and flock of children; Stuart Whitman as an Arizona barn-stormer who behaves more like a cowboy than flier but proves the greatest competition against Fox for the race and for Sarah's hand; Yujiro Ishihara as the inscrutable Japanese entry; Jean-Pierre Cassel as the fun-loving, girl-chasing Frenchman who chases pretty Irina Demick playing a running gag (no pun) in a series of roles. Funniest of all in the large cast are Terry-Thomas as a villainous English cad set to win by fair means or foul—mostly foul—and Eric Sykes as his man who's forced to do much of the dirty work.

As the long film progresses, these caricature characters become more and more obvious—and so do most of the jokes and pratfalls. Perhaps "Magnificent Men" is Britain's answer to our "Mad, Mad World." It has similar Mack Sennett chases and races and slapstick, but actually it is a better and not so irresponsible movie. It has some lovely color photography on its wide screen, attractive Edwardian costumes designed by Oshert Lancaster, and first-rate title cartoons done by Ronald Searle. It may not be my cup of tea, but is should send airplane fanciers to seventh heaven.

The title cartoons (by Robert McGinnis) for "The Hallelujah Trail" are also very good; and so is the lush color photography of New Mexico spread across the big Cinerama screen. And the one advantage that this comedy western epic has over "Magnificent Men" is that it's about people instead of airplanes. Right there the comparisons end. These characters aren't worth a movie that runs for 165 minutes, and the worst of it is that everyone connected with this inept effort seems to be aware that something went wrong long before the piece hits mid-stream at intermission time.

Perhaps in the drawing-board stage "The Hallelujah Trail," which stems from a novel by Bill Gulick, seemed like a good idea. It tells the 1867 story of several groups of people who are moving toward one place where they will battle out their differences. The groups consist of: a wagon train with forty wagons of whiskey led by their owner (Brian Keith) and driven by Irish teamsters; some temperance women determined that the wagons should never reach their destination, Denver, and obstinately led by Lee Remick helped by pretty Pamela Tiffin; some Sioux who in their way are determined to have the whiskey; a parcel of men from Denver who, even more determined that the whiskey should reach their town or they'll have the driest winter in history, are following the guidance and words of wisdom of a nutty drunk (Donald Pleasence); *and* the U. S. Calvary led by Burt Lancaster, who are guarding the temperance women, the whiskey, and eventually the gang from Denver and the Irish who go out on a strike.

When these various groups finally meet, all hell breaks loose—but fortunately you can't see too much of what happens because a sandstorm also breaks loose, and the groups themselves can't tell who's fighting whom or why. Now, maybe on paper this sounded rather funny, but on celluloid it's awful. Producer-director John Sturges must be mainly to blame; at times one even doubts if he was directing his cast, since some of them seem to be acting on their own, and practically all of them adopted their own styles. Perhaps if this mish-mash had been cut to 90 minutes, it could hold an audience. But I'm not even sure of that.

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Strangely enough, the best thing about the film is its maps which explain where the groups are from time to time and what they're heading for. They're not heading for Hallelujah. PHILIP T. HARTUNG

CHINA ON FILM

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ETC.

Felix Greene's "China" is better than home movies, but not quite a documentary. Brochure probably comes closest to describing it. Shuffle recent history differently, with fewer wild deuces on top, and the images on the screen automatically revert to their natural abode in the mother folds of the Sunday *Times*: a sovereign but penurious state with assets chiefly in raw minerals and cheap labor. China seeks other coin, however, sparing us that, but complicating matters. For Greene, whose film is mild, even charming much of the time, the fundamental problem is to convince the home folks that a "new" China exists.

The old China of the newsreels, if simply because they were newsreels, was largely a Western creation. Greene himself bears traces of the English reform tradition, not least the flat, cold-water zeal of that tradition, but he does show us a different China from the one we knew, humane if not thoroughly de-Westernized. A sort of showcase of the new China is Shanghai, where in former days gaity and mass starvation co-habited, producing its most symbolic figure in the child prostitute. Now the exotic character is replaced by a bland industriousness; nobody starves, children go to school. We feel no regret. In the countryside work crews attack blight with the spirit of a fire brigade, and the government's education program touches all ages. Surprisingly little is shown of that supposed key to all modern blessings, heavy industry; rather, one is left the impression of a still overwhelmingly agricultural country, preoccupied with food production, rural electrification, and lesser shades of TVA.

Beyond this, Greene is inclined to see the Chinese as a musical people, especially a country of singers. The examples are engaging, except that occasionally the image of the Trapp Family leaps to mind, multiplied to the nth degree, with its own harrowing story to tell, and an audience that includes the whole of Asia. One does not complain about the people-to-people, hands-stretched-across-the-sea approach. The question is whether any people are left on our side to recipro-

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

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cate; people, that is, in quite the same rural, or tribal, sense.

These scenes have an opposite effect from the one intended. We listen to the Peking Symphony Orchestra perform, and, as well done as it is, we hear a profanation. The direction is wrong. The difference may be between performing for the sake of the music (if not *pour l'art*) and as an expression of some dark inner feeling of self-possession, the dark inner rumblings that in America possess the Goldwaterites and Birchers. In the form of group consciousness and team work, the same feeling pervades, or seems to, all spheres of Chinese life. And even though the Peking Symphony plays to full houses, the apparent harmony between art and society is unsettling today, not to say suspect. One wants to ask if it extends to literature and what is the result, or at least the prospects, if one doesn't know already. For the time being, we shall probably have to be satisfied with team efforts at slum clearance (and feel like cheering as workmen tear into a flimsy wood shack), bridge building and earth moving (here the labor is hard, but not ant-like as one might imagine).

Greene's excellent color photography opens up another whole, and totally unforeseen, dimension of the new China, for not only is the country pleasing, and often spectacular, to the eye, but its color gives China a coherence that is not otherwise easily discernible. The intense organization of the country from afar becomes a drama of alternating flat and brilliant shades not unlike those of Antonioni's chemical plants in "Red Desert." Blue, whether of the sky or the pyjama-style uniform that everybody wears, is ever-present, as are gleaming rows of one thing or another, red tractors, black-headed school children, water-filled irrigation ditches; then of course the human sea parades swathed in solid greens, blues, oranges, the giant red furls looking more like sails in the breeze than banners.

But the emphasis remains on people. Nothing is ever done in China without people, the more the better. One thinks of the phenomenal road construction in the Himalayas during the border dispute with India; in the movie a strait between the mainland and one of the off-shore islands is filled in to provide a rail connection. This job also had to be done by hand, and the scene opens with twenty or thirty junks bobbing picturesquely on the water as young men furiously pitch rocks overboard. On shore more are waiting, gathered by what seemed to be a whole community. But as the strait is closed, a rapids builds up in the narrows, sweeping the rock-laden junks past the dumping point before they can unload. Work stops while the engineers consult; they come up with a bold, if not ingenious, solution, for next we see a flotilla hovering in queue, on the decks the rocks, like huge ballasts, lashed together in cargo nets. As each junk's turn comes up, it shoots the rapids, dropping its load in one heave, splashing, wallowing rocking crazily, and miraculously staying afloat. Not even the Marx Brothers could have done better.

Back in the school rooms the children study hard. Discipline is strict, but on their bright faces is still the look of illusions unlost. One group belts out a bouncy rendition of "We Shall Not Be Moved" which still has the capacity to move.

China has no lack of natural resources, or space, though it is unable to exploit them fully. In the west, away from the great population concentration along the eastern coast, it is steppe country, with Mongol horsemen riding herd and nomads settling down to an arctic winter in their quilt tents. Greene's film projects a country of such natural abundance and wonder as to make beauty almost commonplace. To Western eyes the beauty is somewhat unrelenting, like the cosmos we have put behind us. The effect can be vaguely stifling, as it seems to have been for Tielhard de Chardin, who complained in a letter home of "The same old China . . . blue skies, yellow roofs like circumflex accents, peach trees and pink lilac, the cry of pigeons on the wing . . ." But in Greene's film, and presumably over the airwaves, China calls. PAUL VELDE

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HERBERT A. KENNY

THE GEESE AND THE PHOENIX

Numbing in the ruins of the year
I keep the wake of winter with the candles
cold in the snow. Slow go the frozen hours
stuck in the reluctant blood.
Time limps to the limits
of the necessities of its definition.
In the white wastes of lacklustre
and indifference, blue life
spun by wheeling January
finds spidery dimensions.
Color and molecular heat
diminish to the simplicity
of minimums, past to gross unreality.
And yet, the cove remembers. I rise
and stir the embers in the hearth.
I hear the geese come on. The phoenix
flutters in the ash.

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BOOKS

How we bungled our way in

Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy
VICTOR BATOR
Oceana, $7.50

The New Face of War
MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Bobbs-Merrill, $5

The Making of a Quagmire
DAVID HALBERSTAM
Random House, $5.95

WILSON C. McWILLIAMS

One of the horrors of Vietnam is that the land has become the stage of an international morality play. Day-to-day facts, the names of men and of villages, become symbols of high visions, portents of international evil. Events lose connection with the griefs and exaltations of the men who endure them: abstraction triumphs, and politics, the world between experience and ideal, disappears.

Yet horror or no, that international "test" is the reality of Vietnam, made so because the great contestants have agreed to regard it so. Exported guerrilla war, *revolution à l'outrance*, is being measured against the standard of peaceful coexistence. The three authors, one scholar (Bator) taking the "long view," two journalists (Browne and Halberstam) caught up in present events, understand both the primary horror, and the fact that there is something worse. A morality play is grim: one in which evil triumphs is intolerable, and it may be close to triumph in Vietnam.

It is not that America will "lose" the military test: once it resolves to pay the costs, a super-power cannot "lose" a guerrilla war. Yet it will not pay the price often, and Vietnam has thus far only confirmed China in her belief that guerrilla war can be made so costly to one's foes as to guarantee victory in most times and places. That confirmation is the measure of the American failure in Vietnam.

American policy toward Vietnam has been guilty of three great failings: a failure of statecraft, a lack of political knowledge, an ineffectiveness in political action. Taken together, they spell an almost total political failure: Vietnam is the severest indictment to date of the American conduct of foreign affairs.

Bator makes clear that the failure began at the highest levels. John Foster Dulles delighted in the stance of the crusader, carrying the banners of "liberation" from Communism and "anti-colonialism." The first led him to resist the settlement of Geneva; the latter inspired him to a hostility toward the Western allies which destroyed the alliance. There seems little doubt, in the light of Bator's analysis, that but for Dulles' failure as a statesman the United States might never have been in Vietnam. Dulles was not a statesman, not Machiavelli's Lion armed with the cunning of the Fox. He was not even a crusader. He was a Fox trying futilely to hide under the skin of a leonine rhetoric. Fearful of losing American domestic support if troops were committed to Vietnam, Dulles sought desperately to obtain an international treaty which might justify action. Being balked by Eden, he retreated to a piqued obstructionism (and, Bator implies, vented his resentment by opposing Eden at Suez in 1956) which finally, in a strange fit of desperation, ended with the unilateral commitment of the United States to South Vietnam.

Statesmen may fail, and a nation may lack statesmen. It is to be hoped that the peculiar failings of Foster Dulles are no pattern for the American future. Yet from a bad beginning, the United States moved toward a worse conclusion, binding itself more tightly to Diem. Those bonds, as Halberstam demonstrates, resulted from a failure to understand the political situation of South Vietnam.

The source of the failure was most clearly Ambassador Nolting and with Nolting, the American foreign service. Trained as "experts" they feel uncomfortable with the broader world of politics; trained to maneuver at the level of governmental elites, they tend to lack contact or concern with the base on which any government must rest. Nolting devoted his attention (unsuccessfully) to winning "credit" for America with the already bankrupt Diem regime. Halberstam points to the source of failure when he comments that the Ambassador desperately desired to "take what the Vietnamese government told him at face value." Generals Collins and Taylor, men of broad political as well as military experience, saw through Diem; Henry Cabot Lodge, professional politican, emerges as a hero for both Browne and Halberstam. The politicos saw, at least in part, the political nature of Vietnam (and much of the non-Western world) to which the technocrats were blind.

The peasant does not live, as the romantics would have it, in a warm world of community. He is fearful of an outer world he can neither understand nor control; he is nearly as fearful of his neighbors, for in an insecure world, each takes care of his own; isolated, he tends to give his loyalty and devotion only to his family; politically, his major desire is to be left alone.

In the beginning, the guerrilla may threaten the peasant's life or property in the hope that the peasant will cooperate through fear. That, however, can be partly prevented by government counter-terror which makes the peasant even more fearful of the state. That much Diem—or the Nhus—understood. They were people of the old

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Vietnam, familistic and aloof, with virtues which became vices in the new world they did not understand: unbending righteousness and stubborn perseverance in the old ways. They, and the Americans who listened to them, never understood the dimension beyond terror in guerrilla war. The Viet Cong offered something new which, as Browne realizes, has transformed the "underdeveloped" political mind of the Vietnamese. It offered the experience of organization, the luxury of comradeship and loyalty, the opportunity of daring and excitement. In all, it has provided for thousands the escape from the boredom and the passivity of peasant life, the sense of acting rather than being acted upon. Adolescents may seek a gang; adolescent peoples may, in the same desire for independence, seek a guerrilla war.

Here, as Browne comments, is the least necessary of American failures in Vietnam: the failure of political action. Of all the nations of the world, America has the greatest experience with political organization, the greatest knowledge of the truth that men, to be free, required the encouragement and cooperation of their fellows. More than arms, and certainly more than diplomacy, politics is the American science. It is surely appalling that we have been beaten on our own grounds, and asinine that we should be beaten by default.

Browne and Halberstam indicate the end result: a near impasse in Vietnam. The United States cannot withdraw, and neutralization, as both observe, is as delusory a prospect as winning the war by bombing the North. Of course, diplomatic settlement—the solution Dulles rejected—is the "answer." Yet settlement demands that Peking and Hanoi be brought to abandon the the dreams of conquest—a result which is likely to be costly. The costs will be greater if we do not realize the truth: that the hope of conquest was raised in Peking by our *political* failures, and one military defeat will not "cure" China of the taste for guerrilla war. Hope for political success, in turn, requires that America abandon her technocratic delusions and confide her foreign policy to political men who possess the skill of America's greatest art: the building of political organizations which enable men to free themselves.

Contraception

JOHN T. NOONAN

Harvard University Press, $7.95

WILLIAM BIRMINGHAM

The Pope has promised a statement on birth control. It will, he has indicated, reflect unchanging truth while taking into account the needs and insights of our age. All this will take place within history—a fact that Catholics are prone to forget. The effect of his statement will be not to settle matters but to indicate a direction for future thought and future decision.

John T. Noonan's *Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists,* a superb contribution to the history of theological ideas, is, I am confident, considered an indispensable aid by those charged with advising Paul VI concerning his pronouncement. The book presents all the relevant data with objectivity, restraint, and understanding.

If, at times, the data make conventional teaching on contraception seem ridiculous—what is one to say about the 8th-century penitential, Pseudo-Bede, who prescribed one year's penance for intentional homicide and seven for drinking a contraceptive potion?—the fault is not Noonan's. Indeed, whenever he confronts what is an aberration by modern standards, he situates it historically. Without confusing their ideas with the ideal, he leaves unassailed the sincerity and competence of the man or group under discussion. Noonan's handling of Augustine's sexual pessimism, for example, locates the bishop's excesses within the context of Manichean and Pelagian attacks on marriage—so empathically that, given Augustine's personal history, the reader is left with considerable admiration for the extent to which he transcended his own limitations.

Augustine's contribution remains, after Noonan's scrutiny, intact. No values are lost. In fact, because that which the metaphor of theology calls "eternal truth" is now isolate, much is gained. The same genuine conservatism permeates Noonan's entire discussion. The early fathers who neglected the great marriage texts of Ephesians and 1 Corinthians and embraced a Stoic ideal of procreation, the canonists with their tendency to fossilize truth in law, moralists like Arthur Vermeersch who may have been far too anxious to get *Casti Connubii* written as a blow against the 1930 Lambeth Conference—all are presented within the framework of their serious Christian purpose.

Because *Contraception* is a work of scholarly conservatism, it is also revolutionary. Surely, one of the Catholic Church's greatest achievements has been its dedication to tradition, its confidence that the best of what has gone before must somehow remain. One sees it vividly in Christology. Few things appeal more to man's finite intellect than settling Jesus once and for all: he must be either God or man. Yet, since the earliest Christological heresies, it has been inconceivable that the Church surrender either half of the mystery in order to satisfy the importunities of the analytic mind.

In the theology of marriage, however, the case is quite different. (The problem of birth control is, I suggest, co-extensive with the problem of marriage in Catholic theology.) Christology begins with the experience of Christ. We can say nothing of him unless what we say represents a return through history to him. A theology of marriage, on the other hand, has no such historical absolute to which it can return. Marriage must be worked out sociologically in order that theology may discover ever-richer data for its reflection. The meaning of what theology has said about marriage cannot be understood without reference to the data of profoundly different ages and cultures. There is but one Christ; there are myriad marriages. When the data are understood, the tradition is at once

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more tentative and more illuminating than many have supposed. Thought is liberated.

It would be pointless to summarize Noonan's history of Catholic teaching on contraception. The book must be read, with all its fine detail and careful analysis. Only then will the reader understand the force behind the five propositions that he suggests as embodying—in the face of the Gnostics and the Cathars, of courtly love and Jansenism, of the challenges of our own time—the firm tradition of the Church. "Procreation is good. Procreation of offspring reaches its completion only in their education. Innocent life is sacred. The personal dignity of a spouse is to be respected. Marital love is holy. In these propositions the values of procreation, education, life, personality, and love were set forth. About these values a wall had been built; the wall could be removed when it became a prison rather than a bulwark."

Suppose, however, that what Noonan sees as a wall is, in the Pope's forthcoming statement, deemed a bulwark. Will this book then become irrelevant? Not in the least. Nor will it be irrelevant should the Pope agree with its conclusions. For the fact remains that this statement, too, will be made in history. It will contribute to the action of married Christians and so help form the continually developing data from which the theology of marriage can be formed. It will be part of the process of Christian development, a factor in the incarnation of love that is the Christian's privileged task.

Noonan describes this process of development with felicity and precision. The Lord had said, "This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you." Yet, "What love was, was nowhere specified in the Gospels. Even Pilate did not put the question. The meaning had to be found in the example of the Lord and in some collections of the moral rules endorsed by him. It has taken twenty centuries for Christian experience and meditation to develop what the Church holds to be the central meaning of love. Numerous interpretations, of which the crusades and inquisition are salutary examples, have been tried and discarded. The process of development, of perfecting the demands of love, indeed, continues."

The work of articulating the demands of married love has not progressed far. The reasons are many. Christian insight into the loving vocation of virginity has typically been expressed at the expense of the vocation to marriage. Institutionalization of celibacy, through its disciplinary association with the far wider vocation to the ordained priesthood, has evoked distorted descriptions of the virginal vocation and, too often, resentful pictures of marriage. The rationalist's premise that loss of intellectual control during intercourse deprives man of his full humanity has made it improbable that the scholastic theologian find much to admire in the marriage bed.

Discussions of marriage chiefly by moral theologians and canon lawyers have resulted in specialized views of its nature. (Advanced moral theologians who find no sin in petting to accidental orgasm without coitus during fertile periods, for example, are surprised when married couples express abhorrence for their conclusion—which unfortunately follows from their logic.) Married people have not, until recent years, made known their own experience of their sacrament. Finally, the low status of women did little to enhance conjugal dignity as far as the theologian was concerned and, more tragically, prevented the sacrament from becoming fully the symbol extolled by the great marriage texts of the New Testament.

The terms in which we think of marriage—and the terms in which we experience it—have changed. The old heresies of Gnosticism and Manicheanism remain but, as William Lynch implies in *Images of Hope,* they now reside in the personal and collective psyche—demanding not the refutation of an Augustine but the therapy of human relationships. The old values remain, too, and Noonan has specified them in compelling form. So does the teaching authority of the Church—not

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in the false sense of an absolutist and monarchical authority to which unthinking obedience is due, but in the Christian sense of a community ordered by the command to love.

Such an authority, conscious as it must be (and has been in the cases of slavery, usury, the rights of conscience, the nature of the Church) of the need to grow, to progress, will make its decisions in clarity and confidence. It will, however, perceive as well the need for the witness of protest, if its decision is inadequate to the fullest demands of Christian married persons.

The Church and Urban Renewal

GEORGE D. YOUNGER

Lippincott, $4.50

RICHARD ROBBINS

Urban renewal is to the sixties what public housing was to the thirties—a symbol of hope and a focus of criticism. However, where the critics of public housing were primarily conservatives needlessly worried about "socialism," the present critics of urban renewal are principally liberals concerned, with good reason, about "urban removal"—the lack of attention to the problems of those who must be relocated and rehoused, and the tendency to slight conservation and rehabilitation of existing poor but viable communities in favor of levelling by bulldozer.

To some degree the liberal apprehension has been reduced by changes in the program itself. Initially, under Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, Federal funds were granted to city governments to aid them in clearing slum land and selling it at reduced cost to private developers. Yet the dramatic results in luxury apartment complexes, commercial plazas, and striking civic centers scarcely touched the lives of the poor, the ill-housed, the Negroes relocated to make way for progress. Since the mid-fifties communities have been required to submit a comprehensive "workable program" to Washington and they have been induced to balance "bulldozing" with plans for rehabilitation of decaying neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the renewal, with more than $4 billion in Federal funds expended, is only at the threshold.

George D. Younger is a Baptist minister who knows at close hand the great challenge posed by the spread of blight in the metropolitan core. (He is currently serving a church center on Manhattan's Lower East Side and is working with Mobilization for Youth in that area.) *The Church and Urban Renewal* is written in a quiet, reflective, modest vein. Nearly two-thirds of the book consists of a lucid description of the changing metropolis, the critical issues raised by the persistence of blight, the realistic political skills required to supplement good will and the Christian ethos if urban renewal is to take the direction sketched above.

As befits a moderate, Reverend Younger refuses to follow the lead of the more trenchant liberal critics who write flatly of "the failure of urban renewal." Neither does he succumb to the tough-minded, pragmatic liberal argument, advanced principally by specialists in the renewal program, that all is well, limited goals are after all better than none, and, anyway, New Haven proves the case. Drawing upon interviews with government and church officials in seven selected cities he comes to a favorable but tempered conclusion about the program: "The goals of this effort have not always been clear, the methods used have often been faulty and the amount of resource committed to rebuilding our cities is still inadequate." In general, Reverend Younger looks to increased funds and improved organization to correct earlier mistakes in the program.

The third of *The Church and Urban Renewal* devoted specifically to the role of the churches in the heart of our cities is, like the rest of the book, sensible and perceptive, yet does not go deep enough. Reverend Younger is disturbed by the tendency of inner-city churches, Protestant and Catholic, to drift with the situation or to make very limited commitments. He wants to see local congregations bearing witness and taking up an active mission in the heart of the changing neighborhoods. This is admirable and nicely illustrated in his own work and that of the small numbers of dedicated men and women who have chosen to establish parish centers in the Harlems and South Ends of America. This movement, the very opposite of "slumming" and a shallow activism, should be given maximum support by national denominations.

But I am afraid that the larger issue of which urban renewal is only a part—how to re-house our urban poor in a decent community setting—will have to be fought principally along lines of secular power speaking to secular power. In the coming conflict over the most effective means to combat poverty and slums in our cities we shall have to arrive, sooner or later, at a discussion of the revival of public housing and the introduction of direct housing subsidies.

Reverend Younger shares this view, noting that "all the relocation advice and counsel in the world cannot produce new housing." Are the major churches prepared to move against the scandal of slum housing in our Northern cities with anything like the vigor they have finally begun to display in moving against racial injustice in the South? If not, they abdicate to secular power.

The Church and the Latin American Revolution

FRANCOIS HOUTART AND EMILE PIN, S.J.

Sheed and Ward, $5.95

ALICE MAYHEW

Fathers Houtart and Pin, in this dignified but outspoken analysis, cut away a lot of the simplifications and worried whitewashing that frequently occurs when the subject of the Church in Latin America arises. They are bluntly critical of the Church's position, but their starting point in the discussion of the crisis that now faces the Church, far from being melancholically static, is optimistically evolutionist. The

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problems and the assets of the society in which the Church, as an institution, is trying to survive and lead, are tremendous. Latin America faces three alternatives: prolonged anarchy, violent and/or Communist upheaval, or peaceful and ordered *revolution.*

What is the Church's role in all of this? She bears special responsibility in Latin America by dint of the fact that now one-third, and in thirty-five years, one-half of all the Catholics in the world will live there. Also, her position until quite recently was largely that of a feudal institution in a feudal society. Having opposed the revolutionary movements that threatened her own vast interests, her role and leadership tended to correspond less and less to the real situation on the continent. For example, sixty percent of the secondary schools were run for an elite, by the Church, and had the effect, the authors charge, of ". . . maintaining the cultural monopoly of one social class without contributing to a social revolution and without truly integrating religious values into the changing social order."

The Church, as Leslie Dewart points out in *Christianity and Revolution,* an account of the Church in Cuba (and in theory), when caught in dogmatic anti-Marxism, had laid, ". . . itself open to the charge that it was neglecting the poor and courting the rich. Worse, it also laid itself open to the temptation of actually doing so." A statement by the Brazilian bishops, in 1963, charged that a majority of the population was deprived, by poverty and social exploitation ". . . . from exercising many of man's basic and natural rights, as enunciated in *Pacem in Terris.*" This is a more positive remark than the defense made by the Cuban bishops in August 1960, and quoted by Mr. Dewart—that the Church accepted "with the greatest sympathy whatever measures may contribute to raising the standard of living of the humble . . . and this is what the Church has done *lately* in this country." (Italics mine)

Father Houtart and Father Pin are sociologists, and their concern in this book is to name the socio-cultural elements in which the Church has existed since the days of conquest and evangelization, through the colonial period, and the uprisings that brought political independence but not social reformation. The first part of their book summarizes this background for the central inquiry—whether or not the Church will understand the great sociological and cultural changes that are taking place in Latin America.

The period of upheaval dates roughly from the thirties in Latin America. It is characterized by an expansion of experience on the lower levels of society, which has led them to realize that the peculiar organization of their society, and of their particular status in that society, are neither universal nor necessary. An awe-inspiring population explosion has forced rural dwellers to the cities, and the stable patterns of village and family life have given way to a restless and normless search for a better and more equable organization. The introduction of mass communication, and the beginnings of a genuine middle class, have fortified this impression. Villagers, and others, can now tune in by radio on the rest of the world, including Havana and Moscow.

In the light of this, the Church as well as the rest of the society faces a severe challenge from the forthright opposition of the Communist ideology. Also, the Church, as the authors point out, must deal coherently and meaningfully with the fact that, for a vast majority of the population, religious practices have become a mere part of cultural habit and there is real danger these practices will not survive social upheaval.

Houtart and Pin envision, and outline, a concrete collaboration between Church and State for cultural and social progress. Since the Church does, in fact, exert incalculable influence in Latin America, every initiative should be taken to make it an instrument of cultural and social dynamism. Their book is not given to abstractions, however; it is an attempt to break new ground for the investigation of religious habits and motivations, the nature and practice of devotional and holy-day

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rituals, the place of the parish, family and religious groups, catechetical techniques, and the disparity between nominal membership in the Church and sacramental participation.

In the absence of precise psychosociological studies, the authors admit that they have had to limit themselves to a series of hypotheses which they hope will furnish a theoretical framework. For the moment, we should be grateful to them for listing the possibilities of social evolution, and for demonstrating how the Church has begun her transformation, and on what lines she may proceed. Indeed, they rectify a one-sided pessimism by reviewing the Church's present condition in an evolutionary context. Stating hundreds of instances of dynamic renewal and change, the authors suggest that it can no longer be sincerely claimed that the Church in Latin America is a reactionary force—"the partisans of social change represent the dynamic element of the Church."

The Church must re-establish her spiritual and intellectual contact with the men around her; cease her epic (and useless) battles against legalized divorce, for legal prohibition of Protestants, and for the union of Church and State; face the problems of social inequity and over-population with vigor and imagination; resist the temptation to see Communism behind every new movement; and avoid encouragement of institutional charity and philanthropy over social reform. The lack of priests is severe; nuns and lay deacons must be chosen to alleviate the worsening shortage. And the Church must rid herself of cultural hang-overs—paternalism, triumphalism, authoritarianism.

If the methods of the Cuban revolution can not serve us as model, its objectives must. The authors of this brilliant book note that, ". . . the sign of the Church of Christ [will be] visible to the world [through] her social concern and social action." By the same token, "Those who think they can use . . . spiritual force to avoid social reform, will bear the true responsibility for the orientation of any future revolutions."

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The Anguish of the Jews

EDWARD H. FLANNERY

Macmillan, $6.95

GREGORY BAUM

This history of anti-Semitism is an excellent book. In fifteen chapters the author recounts the horrible story of the hatred and persecutions to which the Jews have been exposed throughout the ages. The book opens with a study of the anti-Semitism of the ancient world, passes through the long centuries of conflict between Church and Synagogue, and ends with an examination of the racial discrimination and genocide of our own age. Since the author is a Christian theologian, a Catholic priest in fact, he is especially concerned with the role of the Christian Church in the spread of anti-Semitic feeling and action in the world. Since he is very conscious of the close relationship between Christians and Jews based on the Scriptures, the author realizes

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throughout that the anti-Jewish tradition of the Christian Church is a kind of betrayal of her own mission.

The book is well and soberly written. Flannery takes a balanced view on many of the issues controverted among historians. Thus he acknowledges the presence of pre-Christian, pagan anti-Semitism on the one hand, without belittling its influence on the Christian Church after the peace of Constantine on the other. The author does not hide the part played by the Church, especially by her hierarchy, in the growing enmity towards the Jews throughout many centuries; at the same time he knows how to present these men of the Church, not as monsters, but as human beings affected by blindness and zeal. He is able to enumerate the crimes committed against the Jewish people in various persons and, at the same time, has the courage to mention that the motives for these crimes, however indefensible, had some foundation in social realities. The author is willing to acknowledge that the anti-Semitic tradititon in Christianity has prepared the ground, and supplied some of the terminological tools, for modern racial anti-Semitism; yet at the same time he insists, and rightly so, that the racial anti-Semitism of our age, responsible for the horrors of genocide, is not the outcome or fruit of the Christian past. Twentieth-century racial anti-Semitism has non-Christian roots!

Flannery remains an historian throughout the book. He does not give in to the noble temptation of many Christian authors of our day to be so overwhelmed by the crimes of the Church that they express themselves with strong emotional overtones and, not without losing some effectiveness, describe the horrors committed by Christians, especially by bishops and popes, in such a one-sided way that the picture drawn hardly remains psychologically credible.

It is curious that Edward Flannery has been severely criticized in several book reviews, notably in *Herder Correspondence* (June 1965), for having produced a work of apologetics. He has been accused of soft-pedaling the involvement of the Christian Church in the anti-Semitism of the past, and of having unduly balanced accounts so that the persecutions inflicted on the Jews do not look much graver than the wrongs committed by Jews. I regard this as an unjustified criticism.

The Anguish of the Jews is not written as an apologia of the Church. The title alone shows where the concern of the author lies. The intention of the book as I understand it, and find confirmed on every page, is to present an authentic historical survey of anti-Semitism in order to make the Christian world, and especially the Catholic people, face what they so rarely see in clear proportions, namely the anti-Semitic heritage of the Christian Church and their own involvement in it. In order to achieve this effect the author refrains from permitting his emotions to break through the narrative. He simply records. He does not feel, shudder, protest or weep for the reader. He leaves these healthy reactions to the readers themselves, overwhelmed as they will be by the evidence of Christian anti-Semitism and the official Church's involvement in it. It is precisely because of this great sobriety that the author will touch readers who would resist a book whose message was more obvious and whose tone was moralizing.

The crimes of the past are so hideous, in regard to the Jews as well as in regard to some other social issues, that it requires a real moment of grace for a Christian to face and accept reality and assume his own responsibility. Experience proves that one does not shock people into deep understanding. The person who wishes to communicate and convince must address himself to the other in the situation in which he is. Writing on the Jewish question, in particular, an author must be very conscious of dealing with a highly charged area for which he must prepare the reader with sobriety and detachment. Flannery knows his Christian audience so much better than the reviewers who have attacked him. He has written an excellent book which will be accepted by all his readers. I regard it as an important publication. I hope that the book will be read by the widest circle of readers, especially by teachers and priests.

REVIEWERS

WILSON C. MC WILLIAMS *is an instructor in government at Oberlin College.*

WILLIAM BIRMINGHAM *edited* What Modern Catholics Think About Birth Control (*Mentor-Omega*).

RICHARD ROBBINS *teaches sociology at Boston College and Wheaton College.*

ALICE MAYHEW *is on the staff of a New York publishing house.*

FATHER GREGORY BAUM *is the author of* The Gospel and the Jews.

CORRESPONDENCE

(*Continued from page 515*)

out and carefully presented. Articles such as this shotgun approach to all the current popular "causes" contribute little (and reflect the rather sad level of COMMONWEAL thinking in urban affairs).

In addition to the oscillation, Mr. Klein dismisses retraining as useless if the poor are confined to the slums. Giving the poor housing only makes poverty less unbearable. Giving the poor some training and education should give them some sense of self-respect, income increase and eventually better housing as well, if they choose that as a way to spend their money. While not trying to sound too elementary, the best way to improve housing for the poor is to increase their ability to buy better housing. Those concerned with the housing would be well advised to focus their efforts on employment. Urban problems are most precisely characterized by their interrelationships. Solutions to them are extremely complex and writing about them is extremely difficult. I've tried and I can see why COMMONWEAL doesn't print many. But frankly, I'd rather you didn't print these newspaper stories. THOMAS E. KRISTOPEIT

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2990 Ministers, Priests and Rabbis Say:

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the Name of God,

STOP IT!

We are aware of the awesome responsibilities you carry; we can imagine the difficulties of making important decisions in the face of conflicting advice from many sources; nor do we doubt your devotion to this nation or to the great goal of peace among all nations. Yet in offering our concerns over American involvement in Vietnam we must be as blunt as honesty requires us to be.

Mr. President, every one of us is deeply, personally dismayed by the role the United States is playing in Vietnam.

It is not a light thing for an American to say that he is dismayed by his country's actions. We do not say it lightly, but soberly and in deep distress. Our government's actions in Vietnam have been and continue to be unworthy either of the high standards of our common religious faith, or of the lofty aspirations on which this country was founded.

Now the United States is engaged in extending the war beyond the borders of South Vietnam, with all the attendant dangers of precipitating a far greater conflict, perhaps even on a global and nuclear scale.

Mr. President, we plead with you to reverse this course. Let us admit our mistakes and work for an immediate cease-fire. Let us call a conference of all the nations involved, including China, not alone to conclude peace but to launch at once a major and cooperative effort to heal and rebuild that wounded land.

Let us declare our intention to withdraw our troops, calling on other states to do the same, thereby allowing the Vietnamese the right of self-determination. We cannot dictate their course, and we may well regret it, but the risk is to be preferred over the certainty that the moral bankruptcy of our present policy is setting the stage for the ultimate victory of totalitarian forces, and even of thermonuclear war.

The prophets and teachers of our Judeo-Christian faith admonished the people of their day, and of all times, to go beyond the old restraints by which injuries might be exactly recompensed, and instead to deal with their enemies with love and good deeds. Yet in Vietnam this nation, so-proudly self-described as "under God," is not content even with "eye for an eye" retaliation, but returns evil for evil on a multiplying scale.

No nation has ever saved either its life or its soul by such methods, and ours will not be an exception. As men and women who have committed their lives to the attempt to explain and interpret the will of God, we have no alternative but to assert on every occasion and in every way open to us our conviction that these methods are not God's methods, but will bring the judgment of God upon our nation.

Mr. President, we plead with you with the utmost urgency to turn our nation's course, before it is too late, from cruelty to compassion, from destruction to healing, from retaliation to reconciliation, from war to peace.

THIS HISTORIC AD

ran in the *New York Times* (and in many newspapers later) the Sunday before President Johnson's significant Johns Hopkins speech about Vietnam. We had hoped that the constructive aspects of that speech would soon abate the "emergency" but have come to see, to our deep distress, the crisis of America's policy in Asia (and in the Caribbean and Africa too!) deepen daily. Join us with your name, your time and your resources, in this great cause.

CLERGYMEN'S
EMERGENCY COMMITTEE
June 30, 1965

Clergymen's Emergency Committee for Vietnam
Box 271, Nyack, N.Y.

- ☐ As a clergyman I add my name to your appeal.
- ☐ I am not a clergyman but I join your appeal also.
- ☐ Please, send me additional information on Vietnam.
- ☐ I want to help spread the message widely and enclose a contribution for this purpose.

Name_____

Address_____

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Clergymen's Emergency Committee for Vietnam

of the Fellowship of Reconciliation

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